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Abstract

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that, in constructing the basic structure of a
just society, any social and economic inequalities must be part of a scheme of cooperation that
works to the benefit of the least advantaged social class. He calls this principle of distributive
justice the difference principle. In A Law of Peoples, however, he backs away from this claim,
arguing for weaker cosmopolitan duties in constructing an international social order. This thesis
does two things. 1.) It explores this tension in Rawls’s work, arguing that in order for the Law of
Peoples to be consistent with A Theory of Justice, Rawls must embrace a global difference
principle. 2.) It then investigates the implications of this conclusion, arguing that a global
difference principle would necessitate robust duties of cosmopolitan aid, but would necessitate
neither a world government nor open borders.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Social contract theory has, historically, looked inward, asking how governments and
societies ought be structured. As the world becomes ever more interconnected, questions of
justice increasingly arise on the international, rather than national, level. These questions of
global justice have received philosophical consideration from a variety of schools of thought,
including Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism. One of the primary
accounts of global justice is that offered by John Rawls. However, Rawls’s theory of
international justice stands in stark contrast with his approach to domestic justice. In the former
case, he advocates minimal principles of justice, whereas in the latter he promotes broad
egalitarian principles. My project here explores this tension. Moreover, I argue that given the
existence and scope of the global basic structure, a Rawlsian account of global justice would
converge with a cosmopolitan account and yield principles of strong economic and social
welfare rights.
This question is important on both philosophical and empirical levels. Theoretically, I
seek to align one of the primary approaches to political theory of international relations with
empirical realities of the world. Moreover, questions of international justice affect the lives and
livelihoods of billions of people around the world. Creating a consistent and valuable theoretical
framework for understanding moral obligations in the international sphere is imperative to
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bringing justice to individuals and states across the globe. John Rawls’s theory of justice
provides one potential source for understanding global justice.
However, Rawls’s conception of justice is strikingly different at the domestic level than it
is in the international sphere. Unpacking the differences between his two approaches requires
discussion of several key terms—justice, the difference principle, and the global basic structure.
Understanding these terms is essential to my later discussion of the application of Rawls’s
domestic conception of justice to the international sphere. How applicable these principles are to
the global order, I argue, depends on the nature global basic structure. In order to frame and
situate justice in the international context, thus, I first define distributive justice, the difference
principle, and global basic structure.

Rawlsian Justice and the Difference Principle
John Rawls writes that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions…laws and
institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are
unjust.”1 An evaluation of global structures or orders must, therefore, begin and end with an
account of justice in a Rawlsian scheme. Rawls’s conception of justice is one of fairness. As
Freeman explains, justice as fairness is
The name Rawls gives to his conception of justice…The name derives from the
idea that fair principles of justice should result from a fair initial choice situation
that incorporates all the relevant moral and practical reasons—the fairness of the
initial situation is presumed to transfer to the principles chosen therein.2
In other words, justice as fairness is the idea that the principles of justice are those that
reasonable people would choose behind a veil of ignorance, that is, without knowing their own
unique social position, race, creed, or other distinguishing characteristics. In the domestic case,
1
2

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 3.
Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. Oxon: Routledge: 473.
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the principles of justice are “the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further
their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental
terms of their association.”3 This initial situation, or position, is the hypothetical original
position. In the original position, participants are behind a veil of ignorance and are thereby
unaware of their particular identities: for example race, gender, or age.4 The principles of justice
that guide Rawls’s theory derive from this position, and create two principles, at least in the
domestic case.
The first principle holds that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”5 In other
words, if a society is just, it must ensure that every person within it has the greatest possible
liberty possible without infringing on the liberty of others. Second, “social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged…and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.”6 Crucially, the first part of the second principle creates what Rawls
calls a difference principle. The difference principle “requires that social and economic
institutions be arranged so as to distribute income and wealth, and powers and positions of office
so as to maximize the share that goes to the least advantaged members of society.”7 The
difference principle thus provides a check on the institutions and basic structures of a society:
any inequalities in the system must be to the advantage of the least well-off.
The other aspect of Rawlsian justice is the idea of justice as reciprocity. Justice requires
reciprocity, which is “a general requirement that each person engaged in cooperation should not
3

Rawls 1971 11
Ibid. 18
5
Ibid. 302
6
Ibid. 302
7
Freeman 467-468
4
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simply benefit (mutual advantage), but should benefit on terms that are fair.”8 In other words,
justice as reciprocity requires that the terms of the institutions be such that mutual benefit is not
enough: the benefit must be on terms that are fair. This account of justice as requiring
reciprocity follows naturally from the idea of justice as fairness. Brian Barry further argues that
“justice as reciprocity [is] the idea that benefits should be required, equal value exchanged for
equal value.”9 For example, if a farmer sells his crop to a merchant, and the merchant pays an
unfairly low wage, the fact that both parties benefited (the farmer received money for his crops
and the merchant received crops to sell) does not mean that the interaction was just, or allowable
under a just system. The exchange must create reciprocal advantage if it is to be fair, and thus
just.
Furthermore, Barry highlights the fundamentally institutional nature of this
conception of justice. He argues:
Justice as reciprocity … already presupposes some more fundamental criterion of
distribution. Contracts presuppose prior property rights; fair exchange is morally
significant only if the parties have a title to what they exchange…and we can talk
about cooperation for mutual benefit only if we have some baseline for measuring
benefits in the absence of cooperation.10

Thus, justice as reciprocity, and hence justice as fairness, demand an institutional conception,
rather than an interactional conception, meaning that they must be institutionalized and cannot
rely exclusively on individual actions to create justice.11 Institutions must establish systems of
justice in order for the criterion of reciprocity to be applicable.

8

Ibid. 481
Barry, Brian. 1980. “Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty.” The Tanner
Lectures on Human Rights. Delivered at Harvard University: 29.
10
Ibid. 35
11
I borrow the terms institutional and interactional, and their meanings as such, from Pogge, Thomas.
1992. “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” Ethics. Vol. 103 No. 1: 48-73.
9
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The Rawlsian framework of justice, then, is conceived as fairness that derives from the
original position, wherein reasonable people under the veil of ignorance select principles of
justice for a fair society. Central to this account of justice as fairness is the idea of justice as
reciprocity, that justice needs to be an equal exchange, or else it is unfair and thus unjust.
So far, this discussion of justice has been focused on Rawls’s conception of domestic
justice, of the institutions and principles at play within the boundaries of a state. Indeed, Rawls’s
focus on justice primarily emphasizes the domestic sphere. In The Law of Peoples, he seeks to
extend his domestic conception of justice as fairness to the international realm. In determining
what justice in an international account would require and entail, he explicitly “duplicates” the
features of a just domestic society.12 Thus, what Rawls sees as essential for justice in the
domestic case—fairness, reciprocity—must also exist in the international case, if the
international case is to be equally just.
Others have offered corollary definitions of global justice. Thomas Pogge argues that “a
plausible conception of global justice must be sensitive to international social and economic
inequalities.”13 Thus, a valid conception of global justice must take into account the
differentiated living situations of those who it most intimately affects. Pogge furthers that “a
liberal conception of justice is defined…as one that…demands that certain rights, liberties, and
opportunities be secure for all citizens, gives this demand a high priority vis-à-vis other values
and interests, and demands that all citizens should have adequate means to take advantage of
their rights, freedoms, and opportunities.”14

12

Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 18.
Pogge, Thomas. 1994. “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 23 (3):
195-224: 196
14
Ibid. 207
13
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In approaching questions of global structures I accept Rawls’s claim that justice is the
criterion by which a system may be evaluated. In going forward, I take justice to be as Rawls
articulates it and as other have expanded it. Justice, then, ought be understood as the principles
for organizing and structuring institutions that actors would choose in an original position
wherein their knowledge about their lives and stakes are restricted. The principles they would
choose would be principles of fairness and reciprocity that ensure that all members of the
contract have their rights maximized as far as is possible without limiting the rights of others,
and that any inequalities are to the advantage of the least advantage, thus preserving the
importance of reciprocity in Rawls’s idea of justice. I apply this universal account of justice in
my discussion of global justice.

Global Basic Structure
The role of justice in the international realm cannot be understood without an
understanding of the concept of a global basic structure. The global basic structure, like the
basic structure of a domestic society, is fundamentally the background conditions and institutions
upon which society is built. I begin with Rawls’s conception of the basic structure in a domestic
society and its implications and then discuss arguments for the existence of an equivalent global
order.
Freeman defines the basic structure of society as, “The design of the basic social and
political institutions that structure daily life and individuals’ decisions and actions, which
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages of social
cooperation.” 15 In other words, the basic structure is the institutions that define and constrain our
choices in a society. The basic structure provides the ‘background justice’ necessary for a just
15

Freeman 464
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society. Background justice is “the justice of laws and social and political institutions that
provide background conditions and constraints upon people’s decisions and actions.”16 The basic
structure thus must ensure this background justice. Without these initial conditions for justice,
no true justice can be achieved. For instance, Rawls contends that contracts entered into without
the just background conditions that a just basic structure creates are invalid.17 Put another way,
the basic structure is “the ways in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental
rights and duties and determine the divisions of advantages from social cooperation.”18 Thus, for
a system to be just, the basic structure must also be just. The converse, however, is also true: If
there is no basic structure, then there can be no social system to be just or unjust. Without a
basic structure, there is no system of political and social institutions to be called just or unjust. If
there is to be any system at all, there must first be a basic structure.
Rawls also specifies several requirements for an acceptable basic structure. It “must
include a family of representative bodies whose role in the hierarchy is to take part in an
established procedure of consultation and to look after what the people's common good idea of
justice regards as the important interests of all members of the people.”19 A basic structure,
therefore, must consider the interests of every member of that society. Thomas Pogge further
clarifies this understanding, providing a definition of a ‘social institution’ which is central to the
concept of a basic structure: “Social institutions are a species of social practices and thus are in
some ways analogous to games and rituals…So the term institution is used here in a sense that—
allowing the … addition of 'social'—contrasts with its other sense of organization or corporation
(as in 'institution of higher learning'). For this latter sense of institution, Rawls uses the term

16

Ibid. 463-464
Rawls 1971 8
18
Ibid. 7
19
Rawls 1999 71. Emphasis added.
17
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association."20 In other words, institutions as conceived in the basic structure are not only
political or social structures that create rules, but also the practices and codes—formalized or
not—that derive from them.
Despite his rejection of the idea of distributive justice, even Nozick’s libertarianism has a
conception of a basic structure.21 Nozick’s basic structure, unlike Rawls’s, "consists of certain
prohibitions against force and fraud, certain rules of acquisition, transfer, and rectification of
holdings, and some basic mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement." 22 Even this minimalist
account allows for the importance of background conditions that structure interactions and
institutions. 23
An understanding of a basic structure of a system is essential to understanding the moral
obligations that that system engenders. Responsibility for something is typically understood to
be based on causality. That is, I cannot have responsibility for something that I did not, in some
way, cause. Thus, the basic structure is essential for determining the rightness of a course of
action or institution. As Pogge argues:
Once this focus on a social system's basic structure has been fully understood, it
has a strong claim to primacy within moral reflections quite apart from whether
one believes in social contracts of free and equal moral personhood. The reason
is that we cannot, conceptually or causally, evaluate what we are doing to others
without understanding the structure of the ground rules that give meaning to our
actions and omissions and determine their (often remote) repercussions.24
This addition is important in considering the existence and implications of a global basic
structure. Rawls’s discussion of basic structures is limited to the domestic sphere. If a domestic

20

Pogge 1989 21
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia New York: Basic Books. 149
22
Ibid. 24
23
See my discussion of the Lockean proviso in Chapter 3
24
Ibid. 25
21
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basic structure is the institutions and practices that provide the background justice for a liberal
society, then the same principles must apply to the international case as well.
The question of an international global order has two parts. First and foremost, what are
the implications of the existence of a global basic structure for necessitating or influencing global
justice? Second, and subsidiary to the first is the empirical question of whether or not a global
basic structure akin to the domestic case really exists.25 Even if the answer to the latter question
is no, the original analysis and discussion on implications of a potential global basic structure
will still stand, both in the abstract and because I believe it is beyond contention that the world is
ever more interconnected. Thus, even if we do not live in a world with a global basic structure
(though I will argue otherwise later), we may eventually get there, at which point an
understanding of what kind of structures and institutions are morally required there will be
necessary.
Charles Beitz argues for a “global normative order” akin to a global basic structure. He
contends that this global normative order is “the body of norms that are more-or-less widely
accepted as regulative standards for conduct in various parts of global political space."26 Human
rights, for instance, are part of this global order.27 This is a rather minimal understanding of the
role of the global basic structure. By only referencing norms, which do not carry the weight of
treaties, laws, or other mechanisms of ratification or codification, the global basic structure is
relatively weak.
Rawls takes a stronger stance on the global basic structure, arguing that the Law of
Peoples, which exists to ensure global justice, "holds that inequalities are not always unjust, and
that when they are, it is because of their unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of
25

I leave this question for chapter three.
Beitz, Charles. 2009. The Idea of Human Rights. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK. 209
27
Ibid. 209
26
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Peoples.”28 In other words, inequalities are such because of their implications for the justice or
injustice of the global basic structure. This means that it is to the integrity of the global basic
structure that we must appeal when determining the acceptableness of an institution or practice.
If there is a global basic structure, it must be concerned with global justice. A non-moral
structure would be, as Pogge argues, wholly insufficient. If a global order is unconcerned with
domestic justice:
Since each state is sovereign over its internal affairs, this international order
generates no countervailing forces that would resist the degeneration of a national
basic structure. Such institutional indifference to the domestic (in)justice of
national regimes aggravates the instability of the proposed world order because it
undermines the moral reasons for unconditional compliance with international
laws and treaties.29
According to Pogge, the reason that an international order of any kind is premised upon the
strength of its moral claims. If an international order has moral legitimacy, it must ensure
justice. Ensuring justice requires both recognition of the existence of a global basic structure,
and also steps to ensure its justice. My project here, thus, attempts to reconcile deontological
approaches to global justices with the global basic structure.
In chapter two, I offer summarized evaluations of the three primary deontological
approaches to international justice: Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism. In
each account, I articulate the goals and methodology of the approach, and discuss how that
approach accounts for global justice. Moreover, I clarify distinctions within the competing
accounts, distinguishing, for example, institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism.
In chapter three, I offer analysis of these three approaches in light of the global basic
structure. I argue that the deeply interconnected reality of international relations, trade,
communication, and culture creates a global basic structure that gives rise to deep institutional
28
29

Rawls 1999 113. Emphasis added
Pogge, Thomas. 1989. Realizing Rawls. Cornell University Press: 245
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injustices. An account of global justice, I contend, must account for this. Within the Rawlsian
framework, then, I hold that given the rise of the global basic structure, Rawls’s reasons for
rejecting libertarianism in the domestic case are equally valid on the international level, and thus
libertarianism cannot provide a just account of global justice in the Rawlsian sense.
Furthermore, I argue that cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism would converge on an
account of global justice that (1) holds states as the actors, (2) develops principles in an
international original position, (3) has broad and inclusive principles of membership, (4)
promotes a robust notion of human rights that constrains but preserves reasonable cultural
pluralism, and (5) advocates egalitarian distributive principles.
In chapter four, I explore implications and objections to the proposal that I make in
chapter three. Within the Rawlsian framework, the primary objections stem from the concern
that the model that I advocate does not achieve a realistic utopia. The idea of a realistic utopia is
the idea that political theory must promote institutions and actions that would be considered
reasonable and rational to just constitutional democratic societies. In other words, a political
theory satisfies the criterion of a realistic utopia if the theory could be achieved. For Rawls, it is
vital not only that a political theory be just in theory, but also that just could be implemented in
practice. The concern that my proposal is not a realistic utopia manifests into an implementation
objection and a sustainability objection. The implementation objection holds that the principles
of international justice articulated here would never be achieved, because the empirical reality of
power in the world would never allow for distributive justice or principles of cooperation that
benefit the least well-off. Put another way, the implementation objection holds that those that
benefit from the global basic structure’s inequalities and injustices are those with power, and
thus have no incentive to seek any kind of change to that structure. The sustainability objection
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holds that the principles argued for here, even if implemented, would result in unacceptable or
impractical outcomes and the international structure created would collapse in on itself. This
objection holds that my proposal would necessitate open borders, which would cause separate
states to collapse into a world state. Because my theory is built with states as the actors in an
international social contract, a collapse of states into a world state would necessarily collapse my
argumentation. However, I reject both objections, arguing that neither understand nor
meaningfully challenge my proposal.
An additional objection to my argument is that the global basic structure is not
comparable to the domestic basic structure, and thus the tension that I demonstrate and seek to
resolve between Rawls’s domestic and international cases does not exist. If this tension does not
exist, then the convergence that I advocate between cosmopolitan and Rawlsian liberal
conceptions of global justice likewise cannot exist. However, I contend that, like realistic utopia
objections, this objection is ultimately not compelling.
I conclude by drawing implications from my analysis and suggest some next steps in
determining and promoting social justice. I make suggestions for theorists in Rawlsian liberal
and cosmopolitan camps and argue that further investigation ought be done both in determining
policy implications of my theory and in exploring the implications of my argument beyond the
scope of poverty and welfare that I am primarily concerned with here.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Cosmopolitan, Liberal, and Libertarian
Approaches to Global Justice

Global justice is a complex topic that attracts philosophers from a variety of schools.
Any attempt to understand it, thus, must begin with a discussion of these competing schools of
thought. There are three primary deontological approaches to global justice: Rawlsian
liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism. I will discuss these approaches on a variety of
levels, asking (1) How should a just international order be structured and who or what ought be
the actors? (2) What is the scope of an international order? (3) What are the potential institutional
implications? This discussion clarifies and informs the argumentation and position I take in
subsequent chapters.
The discussion of the global basic structure provided in chapter one is important because
it frames and informs the three primary theories of a global basic structure I discuss below.
Understanding the global basic structure is important because “it has such a profound influence
upon who we are and our life prospects, and is necessary for background justice, the basic
structure of society is the ‘first subject’ of justice: principles of justice apply directly to structure
its basic structure are the political constitution; the legal system of trials, property, and contracts;
the system of markets and regulation of economic relations; and the family.1 Thus, it is with this
conception of a global basic structure in mind that I turn now to the discussion of the three
primary perspectives on global justice.

1

Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. Oxon: Routledge 464
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In this chapter, I will discuss the three primary accounts of what global justice ought look
like: Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, libertarianism. In doing so, I seek to demonstrate
the strengths and weaknesses of each view, the proposed structure and scope of each view, and
roughly sketch the potential implications of each view. I set aside the issue of utilitarianism, as I
am primarily concerned here with more Kantian, deontological perspectives on global justice.2
Moreover, because my focus is Rawls’s conception, my discussion of cosmopolitanism and
libertarianism will be relational to Rawlsian liberalism.

Rawlsian Liberalism
John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples argues for the application of a moderated version of his
domestic liberalism in the international sphere. This work encapsulates and creates the liberal
conception of global justice. Rawlsian liberalism develops from and is guided by Rawls, though,
like any tradition, not all Rawlsian liberals agree with Rawls. As Kantian may embrace Kant’s
categorical imperative and emphasis on rationality, but reject Kant’s argument that one may not
lie to a murderer at the door, so too may a Rawlsian liberal accept Rawls’s principles but dispute
how they are applied. Thus, I distinguish between Rawlsian liberals and Rawls himself.
In its essence, the Law of Peoples that Rawls proposes is the system by which liberal
peoples establish and maintain the principle of justice as fairness in the international realm. Like
the domestic case, the Law of Peoples is a hypothetical exercise. However, unlike the domestic
case, which is a contract between individuals, the Law of Peoples is “determined by a
hypothetical contract… among the representatives of different nations. They … are to be put
behind a veil of ignorance regarding facts about themselves and their societies, and come to an
2

For a utilitarian account of cosmopolitan moral duties, see: Singer, Peter. 2010. The Life You Can
Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty. Random House: New York.
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agreement upon principles of justice to regulate relations among different societies.”3
Representatives of different groups, rather than the members of the groups themselves, enter into
an original position and determine the principles of international justice. Further, “parties in the
international original position are motivated only by individual interests, in this case the interests
of their individual nation. But their interest is a moral one…maintaining the justice of their own
basic structure.”4 Thus, the concerns at hand in the international original position are moral
concerns, but domestic concerns. The representatives of the different groups are concerned with
securing and maintaining justice for their domestic structures, but not ensuring justice for people
outside of their group.
Intriguingly, Rawls makes the actors represented by the representatives in the original
position peoples, not states. According to Rawls, peoples have three basic features. They have
“a reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests;"
are “united by…common sympathies;” and have “a moral nature”.5 Buchanan further clarifies
this distinction: “for Rawls, peoples are groups with their own states.”6 Thus, we can understand
Rawls’s conception of peoples as moral, united in common sympathies, and contained with and
fully containing of their own state. This is important in creating a law of peoples, because
Rawls argues that “the idea of peoples…enables us to attribute moral motives –an allegiance to
the principles of a Law of Peoples, which, for instances, permits wars only of self-defense—to
peoples (as actors), which we cannot do for states.”7 In the second original position, which

3

Freeman 417-418
Ibid. 418
5
Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 23.
6
Buchanan, Allen. 2000. “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World. Ethics.”
Vol. 110, No. 4. Pp. 697-721: 698.
7
Rawls 1999 17.
4

Fetrow 20

constructs the just Law of Peoples, we must have moral actors, because, as in the first original
position, “the parties are presumed to be capable of a sense of justice.”8
States, on the other hand, “are often seen as rational, anxiously concerned with their
power--their capacity (military, economic, diplomatic) to influence other states-- and always
guided by their basic interests.”9 Rawls understands states as having full sovereignty over their
domestic affairs. Unlike peoples, who “must meet certain minimal standards…[of] human
rights…in their internal affairs,”10 Rawls understands states as completely in control of their
territory in the full Westphalian sense. In short: the key difference between states and peoples as
Rawls understands them is that peoples have moral natures and limited sovereignty, whereas
states are amoral, self-interested, and have full domestic sovereignty. Moreover, the salient
difference between a ‘people’ and a ‘state’ is that peoples “are politically organized, and their
form political organization is that of statehood, even if….they do not have all the traditional
powers [of sovereignty] accorded to states.”11
Rawls contends that the representatives of peoples would choose the following principles
in order to achieve these goals:
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to
be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons
other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.12
8

Rawls 1971 145.
Rawls 1999 28.
10
Buchanan 2000 699.
11
Buchanan 2000 699
12
Rawls 1999 37
9
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These principles exist to ensure that the rules are “acceptable to reasonable peoples who are thus
diverse and it must be fair between them and effective in shaping the larger schemes of their
cooperation.”13 The value of these rules, and their restrictions, is to ensure reasonable pluralism
in a world order, a cornerstone of the Law of Peoples.
Reasonable pluralism is the idea that people can hold different opinions on an issue, and
be convinced of the rightness of their position, and still accept that the other position is a valid
and acceptable position to take.14 Rawls emphasizes the importance of reasonable pluralism in
his Law of Peoples because he seeks to create a realistic utopia. In order to achieve this, he says
we must “take people as they are.”15 Given the fact of reasonable pluralism—that is, though not
all people agree on culture, religion, or morality, the views that they take can tolerate the
existence of other views and perspectives—reasonable pluralism must have a central role in an
international account.
The value of reasonable pluralism is complicated by the existence of non-liberal peoples.
Rawls holds that “a main task in extending the Law of Peoples to nonliberal peoples is to specify
how far liberal peoples are to tolerate nonliberal peoples.”16 By ‘tolerate’, Rawls means “to
recognize these nonliberal societies as equal participating members in good standing of the
Society of Peoples, with certain rights and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring
that they offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their
actions."17 A Law of Peoples cannot require that all peoples are liberal, because doing so “would
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fail to express the toleration for other acceptable ways of ordering society.”18 Thus, the principle
of toleration requires that the law of peoples allow for reasonable pluralism.
There are, however, limits to such pluralism. Rawls contends that, though denying
respect and autonomy to other groups requires very important reasons in order to be justifiable,
peoples cannot deny their members basic human rights, nor may they “deny their members the
right to be consulted or a substantial political role in making decisions.”19 This is because
consultation is necessary for a society to be well-ordered, and only well-ordered societies have
the capacity to participate in the Law of Peoples. Rawls defines human rights as a set of
“necessary, though not sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political and social
institutions.”20 Thus, human rights are necessary for the following:
1. Their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society's
political institutions and of its legal order.
2. Their fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by
other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave
cases by military force.
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.21
Human rights, therefore, are understood as the limits on the reasonable pluralism that
underscores the law of peoples. The limitations on participation in the Law of Peoples are most
directly relevant to the inclusion of decent hierarchical and burdened peoples, outlaw states, and
benevolent absolutisms.
Rawls’s stated aim is to “extend the law of peoples to decent societies and to show that
they accept the same Law of Peoples that liberal societies do. This shared law describes the kind
of Society of Peoples that all liberal and decent societies want, and it expresses the regulative

18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
19

59
61
80
80

Fetrow 23

end of their foreign policies.”22 A decent hierarchical society, according to Rawls, fulfills two
criteria. First, decent peoples do not have aggressive aims, that is, they do not attempt to invade,
colonize, or engage in war with other peoples or states.23 The second criterion has three
components. First, “a decent hierarchical people’s system of law, in accordance with its
common good idea of justice…secures for all members of the people what have come to be
called human rights.”24 In other words, a decent hierarchical society protects basic human rights.
Second, a decent hierarchical society imposes moral duties and obligations on its people.25 It
requires its people to fulfill roles within that society according to moral obligations. Moreover,
the people in a decent hierarchical society recognize these obligations, rather than acting merely
out of fear of punishment.26 Third and finally, “there must be a sincere and not unreasonable
belief on the part of judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is
indeed guided by a common good idea of justice.”27 That is, those that enforce the law must
believe they do so in the interest of justice, not merely personal gain.
Decent peoples, furthermore, generally have a “decent consultation hierarchy,” though he
holds in reserve the possibility of a decent people that does not have this feature yet still remains
decent.28 Importantly, decent peoples are “associationalist in form: … the members of these
societies are viewed in public life as members of different groups, and each group is represented
in the legal system by a body in a decent consultation hierarchy.”29 Often, these groups are based
on religious ideology and beliefs, wherein certain religious groups or groups delineated by
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religion are the units of consultation, rather than individual peoples. Thus, consultation happens
through groups, not through individuals as it does in liberal societies. The system that this
organization structure engenders may not be liberal. For instance, women or minority groups
may face social restrictions or be banned from public office. However, because their structure
still enables liberal societies to interact with them—they have moral tendencies and a
consultation hierarchy, they are sufficiently well-ordered to deserve equal participation in the
Law of Peoples.
Outlaw states, by contrast, are regimes that refuse to comply with the principles of a Law
of Peoples.30 In other words, they either pursue aggressive policies internationally through
waging war or other acts that infringe on liberal states, or violate the human rights of those
within their borders. Outlaw states are not just a threat to their own citizens, but also to the Law
of Peoples more broadly, because they are “aggressive and dangerous; all people are safer and
more secure if such states change, or are forced to change, their ways. Otherwise, they deeply
affect the international climate of power and violence.”31 Rawls argues that “an outlaw state that
violates … [human] rights is to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful
sanctions and even to intervention” with the intention of making the society honor human rights
and become a full member of the Law of Peoples.32 Thus, liberal and decent peoples “simply do
not tolerate outlaw states. This refusal…is a consequence of liberalism and decency.”33 Rawls’s
position on outlaw states both entrenches the importance of human rights in his account, and also
defines the limits of tolerance of pluralism: while the non-liberal consultation hierarchies of
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decent peoples are allowable under Rawlsian reasonable pluralism, the absolute disregard for
human rights of outlaw societies is not.
Societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, or burdened societies, present yet another
facet of Rawls’s non-ideal theory. For Rawls, “burdened societies…lack the political and
cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological
resources needed to be well-ordered.”34 While the eventual goal of liberal societies ought to be to
allow these societies to liberalize, for Rawls, this does not necessitate a distributive principle,
because “a society with few natural resources and little wealth can be well-ordered if its political
traditions, law, and property and class structure with their underlying religious and moral beliefs
and culture are such as to sustain a liberal or decent society.”35 Members of a Law of Peoples
have a duty of assistance to aid burdened societies, but this duty “may stop once just…basic
institutions have been established.”36 On Rawls’s account, this duty is based not on ideals of
justice and reciprocity, but rather on respect for human rights, and the desire to promote rights
even outside of liberal societies.
Finally, Rawls briefly mentions benevolent absolutisms, which “honor most human
rights, but because they deny their members a meaningful role in making political decision, they
are not well-ordered.”37 In other words, though benevolent absolutisms are non-aggressive and
honor human rights, they are not well-ordered insofar as their citizens have no role in the
political process. Thus, are excluded from a Law of Peoples because they are not well-ordered.
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These distinctions between different ‘types’ of peoples and states are structurally
important to a Rawlsian liberal account of international justice. They define the limits on
participation, and thus the scope, of international justice for Rawls.
Rawls is not the only advocate for Rawlsian liberalism in global justice. Allen Buchanan,
for instance, agrees with the core foundations of Rawls’s argument, yet disputes some of Rawls’s
conclusions. Buchanan holds that using peoples rather than states “courts confusion: given that
the term ‘people’ is often used to refer to ethnic or national groups, including those that lack their
own states.”38 States, according to Buchanan, are not the sovereign, Westphalian monoliths that
Rawls envisions. Thus, Buchanan does not find “it necessary to reject the term ‘state’ and
replace it with the word ‘people’.”39 Buchanan identifies what he terms a “fundamental lack” in
The Law of Peoples: “the lack of principles of international distributive justice.”40 Buchanan
holds that essential to an effective law of peoples is an understanding that the global basic
structure influences people’s lives similarly to domestic structures. He argues that the global
basic structure’s existence is sufficient to merit its regulation by the principles of justice. He
thus advocates that participants in the international original position would consider how the
global basic structure would affect their group, and “strive to ensure that their societies are not
disadvantaged by the global basic structure.”41 They would thus “avoid principles that might
turn out to assign them to an inferior status” in that global basic structure.42 Thus, Buchanan
argues for a more egalitarian and connected understanding of global justice through the lens of
Rawlsian liberalism.
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Similarly, Wilfred Hinsch argues for an egalitarian form of Rawls’s law of peoples,
proposing amending the law of peoples to include a form of federalism.43 Hinsch’s two-tiered
federal system would require greater duties of assistance than Rawls’s more minimalist proposal,
but would maintain separate states (as opposed to a world state).44 It would also require “global
redistribution in conformity with the Difference Principle.”45 Because of the interconnected
nature of the global basic structure, Hinsch argues, we have an obligation to greater egalitarian
principles.46
The importance of examining alternative perspectives on Rawlsian liberalism is that it
demonstrates that Rawls’s Law of Peoples may be used in more egalitarian forms. In other
words, simply because Rawls does not include discussion of the global basic structure, or allow
for redistributive principles in his international contract does not mean that including them would
undermine or flow against his theory overall.
In the next chapter I shall explore this approach further, adding to it the centrality of the
global basic structure. Given the global basic structure’s similarity in its scope, breadth, and
impact to the domestic basic structure, I argue, a Rawlsian liberal account of global justice would
converge with a cosmopolitan account in order to stay to stay true to the methodology and
mission of Rawlsian liberalism as well as with reality.

Cosmopolitanism
The second main deontological approach to global justice is cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism’s central premise is that all persons, regardless of nationality or other
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distinctions, must be the ultimate unit for moral consideration. There are two sets of distinctions
within cosmopolitanism that provide nuance to a cosmopolitan understanding of global justice:
moral and legal cosmopolitanism; and institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism.47
At its core, cosmopolitanism has three fundamental aspects: individualism, universality,
and generality.48 Individualism holds that “the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or
persons.”49 Universality holds that “the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living
human equally,” thus not preferring one over another based on membership in some subset such
as race, gender, socioeconomic class.50 Finally, generality holds that this concern for all persons
has “global force,” rather than being limited by nationality or region.51 Cosmopolitan theorists
of global justice, thus, “hold that there is nothing morally special about political boundaries,” and
so our moral obligations are neither defined by or end at these boundaries.52
The first important distinction in cosmopolitan theories of global justice is the distinction
between moral and legal cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism “is committed to a concrete
political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties,
that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic.”53 In other words, legal cosmopolitanism
requires strong international institutions that treat all persons equally and justly. Moral
cosmopolitanism, by contrast, “holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations to one
another: we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern—a
I use here Pogge’s distinction between moral and legal, institutional and interactional. However,
Charles Beitz uses the term ‘institutional’ as Pogge uses the term ‘legal’ (see Beitz, Charles. 1999.
“Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” International Affairs 75, pp.125-140). To avoid confusion, I use
Pogge’s terms (moral and legal), rather than Beitz’s terms (moral and institutional) in order to allow for
less ambiguity in using Pogge’s institutional and interactional distinction.
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requirement that imposes limits…upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes.”54 These
limits may be different, however, from the strong international institutions required by legal
cosmopolitanism. Importantly, “the central idea of moral cosmopolitanism is that every human
being has a global stature as an ultimate unity of moral concern.”55 Yet, we may simply define
moral cosmopolitanism “in terms of human rights,” rather than by institutional mechanisms.56
Note that these two views are compatible, not mutually exclusive, and may address different
aspects of global justice.
The second important distinction is between institutional and interactional
cosmopolitanism. Institutional cosmopolitanism “postulates certain fundamental principles of
justice [that]…apply to institutional schemes and are thus second-order principles: standards for
assessing the ground rules and practices that regulate human interaction.”57 In other words,
institutional cosmopolitanism deals with the background structure and institutions that guide and
shape human interactions, rather than with the character of those institutions themselves. It
provides a mechanism to evaluate or create this basic structure such that each person is treated
fairly and justly. Interactional cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, “postulates certain
fundamental principles of justice…[that] apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups.”58
A useful way in which to consider the difference between institutional and interactional
cosmopolitanism is that institutional cosmopolitanism operates on the macro level, analyzing
institutions. On this perspective, human rights “impose constraints on shared practices.”59
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Conversely, interactional cosmopolitanism operates on the micro level, wherein human rights
constrain conduct and specific individual actions.60
Most relevant to the discussion of global justice is institutional cosmopolitanism. Given
the essential nature of the basic structure described above, an account of global justice must
meaningfully deal with the institutions that create this structure. Thus, henceforth, when I refer
to cosmopolitanism, I refer to institutional cosmopolitanism.
Moral institutional cosmopolitanism holds that because human rights exist within the
context of a global basic structure that affects and is affected by every person, violations of rights
are “everyone’s concern.”61 In other words, “institutional interconnections…render obsolete the
idea that countries can peacefully agree to disagree about justice, each committing itself to a
conception of justice appropriate to its history, culture, population side and density, natural
environment, geopolitical context, and stage of development."62 Even with reasonable pluralism,
there must be a universal conception of justice for the global basic structure, because global
institutions "can at any time only be structured in one way.”63 Further, institutions cannot be
assessed for their justice individually, because of the interconnectedness of the network of justice
(or injustice) that they create. It is the overall system and structure that must be evaluated.64
Moreover, claims about the justice or injustice of system and its institutions must “be based on
an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected” by those
institutions or structure.”65
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And yet cosmopolitan theorists differ on their approach to global justice. Some, such as
Luis Cabrera, embrace a world government, arguing for an integrated world system both socially
and economically.66 Cabrera, however, is in the minority among cosmopolitans. Even Brian
Barry, who advocates a form of international federalism akin to the existing European Union,
shies away from embracing a world without borders.67 Instead, cosmopolitans tend towards
different levels of regulations between nations, embracing the pragmatic benefits to individuals
of a localized government that can best understand and respond to their individual cultural needs.
Moreover, “the world government approach reflects "the dogma of absolute sovereignty," which
cosmopolitans seek to avoid, because of the human rights abuses it engenders.68 The fact of
states, however, does not lend them moral weight as it does in Rawlsian liberalism. Instead,
institutions like states derive their legitimacy from their ability to support human rights and
increase general human welfare.69 Thus, implications of a cosmopolitan perspective tend towards
cosmopolitan liberalism.
Cosmopolitan liberalism adopts the hypothetical contract of Rawlsian liberalism, with the
difference that the actors in the international original position are individuals, rather than peoples
(or states). Cosmopolitans agree that the principles that individuals would pick egalitarian
principles of economic redistribution. Pogge calls for a global resource tax that taxes
consumption and uses the funds raised to aid those least well-off.70 Beitz calls for distributive
justice and duties of assistance to ensure reciprocity. 71 Barry contends that individuals in a global
original position would choose principles that include equal rights to natural resources, taxes on
66
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resource extraction, and international income tax on gross domestic product.72 What
cosmopolitans do agree upon, however, is that global justice requires economic, rather than
merely social reciprocity and justice.
Cosmopolitanism is an umbrella term for several forms of the theory. The implications
of the different branches of the theory, while varied in their particulars, are all built around the
essential nature of the individual as a moral actor. Thus, a cosmopolitan approach to global
justice calls for redistribution and other economic measures to create basic structural equality in
the global basic structure in order to promote the rights of individual persons.
In the next chapter, I draw upon this discussion of cosmopolitanism in order to develop a
coherent approach to international justice given agreement between cosmopolitanism and
Rawlsian liberalism in the context of the global basic structure.

Libertarianism
The third and final deontological approach to global justice is libertarianism. If Rawlsian
liberalism sits in the middle, with cosmopolitanism pulling towards greater egalitarianism,
libertarianism pulls the other direction, arguing for less governmental reach and thus greater
liberty. Libertarianism holds that persons are autonomous agents who own themselves and can
acquire property rights. The government (or an international structure) commits an injustice
when it limits or restricts these property rights. There are three principle branches of
libertarianism: Nozick’s entitlement theory, mutual advantage theory, and libertarianism as
liberty.
Robert Nozick argues that “individuals have rights, and there are things no person or
group may do to them (without violating their rights).”73 Thus, institutional intervention on
72
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persons must be minimal. “For Nozick, social justice requires that governments interfere as little
as possible with private arrangements, and devote themselves instead to protecting such
arrangements.” 74 In other words, government’s function is to allow people to enter into free
agreements with others, providing only minimal protection or limitations on the content or form
of such agreements. Thus, Nozick holds that “the minimal state is the most extensive state that
can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people’s rights.”75 A minimal state (or its
international equivalent) must therefore be narrow, restricted, and very limited. Further, Nozick
argues that “there is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the
resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.”76 In other words, because people are
equal, no one person or group has the right to determine which persons get which goods.
Allowing a larger government would thus violate rights of individuals.
On a libertarian perspective, there is no basic structure of either a domestic society or of
the international community in the full sense that Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans contend.
Instead, any institutions or norms are “the product of many individual decisions which the
different individuals are entitled to make.”77 It is not, as perceived by Rawlsian liberals and
cosmopolitans, the result of a network of interlocking institutions and practices, but rather a
collection of individual choices operating independently. In this framework, regulative control
of the basic structure is unnecessary and infringes upon the rights of individuals.
One of the primary implications of the libertarian stance on the basic structure is that
libertarians reject (nearly) any form of distributive justice advocated by Rawlsian or
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cosmopolitan liberals. In fact, “Robert Nozick stands as one of the foremost intellectual
antagonists to claims for distributive justice”78 For Nozick, Rawls’s retributive principle in the
domestic case is flawed because: “(1) Rawlsian redistribution (or other coercive government
interventions in market exchanged) is incompatible with recognizing people as self-owners.
Only unrestricted capitalism recognizes self-ownership. (2) Recognizing people as self-owners
is crucial to treating people as equals.”79 In other words, when government structures take
legitimately earned property away from individuals, they deny the right to self-ownership of
individuals, an inexcusable violation of liberty.
Instead of redistributive justice, Nozick proposes a three part entitlement theory. In a
just world, all holdings would follow the following principles: First, “a person who acquires a
holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.”80 In
other words, as long as the property was acquired legitimately (not, for instance, stolen), the
possessor has a right to it. Second, “a person who acquires a holding in accordance with the
principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the
holding.”81 Hence, the person who holds something has the right to dispose of it as he or she
will. Finally, “no one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of [the first two
principles].”82 Thus, governmental bodies are not entitled to involvement and distribution of
property, because doing is a violation of the rights of those who had the property before it was
redistributed. Further, “Nozick believes that self-ownership inevitably leads to unrestricted
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property-rights.”83 Governments ought not limit or restrict property rights, therefore, either at the
domestic or global level. Thus, he argues, “the choice of economic regime should be
decided…by the consent of self-owning people…self-owning people would all choose a
libertarian regime, if it were up to them.”84 He accepts, thus, the mechanism for determining
social cooperation. Where he differs, then, is on the implications, rather than the structure or
framework of the question.
Nozick offers an influential and important perspective on libertarianism, yet his is not the
only perspective. While Nozick’s is most directly in contrast to Rawlsian libertarianism, and
thus most relevant to my discussion, I will briefly explain the other two main branches of
libertarianism in order to provide nuance and accuracy to my discussion.
The second principle form of libertarianism is mutual advantage theory. Like Nozick’s
entitlement theory, “mutual advantage theorists…use a contract device, but for opposite reasons
[than Rawls]. For them, there are no natural duties or self-originating moral claims. There is no
moral equality underneath out natural physical inequality.”85 The social contract is merely a
useful device insofar as it benefits everyone. Because all participants benefit, the contract is
formed. There is, however, no moral underpinning to the contract. This is in stark opposition to
Rawlsian liberalism. Rawls argues that contracts are unjustified if one participant stands to
benefit disproportionately, because this type of contract is coercive and does not adhere to the
principle of fairness. By contrast, mutual advantage libertarianism holds that all types of
contracts are allowable if both parties stand to benefit—regardless of the relative distribution of
those benefits. Mutual advantage theory is also fundamentally different from Nozick’s Lockean
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libertarianism. Indeed, like Rawls, Nozick argues that his entitlement theory also has Kantian
foundations because it treats each person as end and not a mere means. However, like
entitlement theory, mutual advantage libertarianism rejects the essential nature of the basic
structure in determining the background conditions that determine the justice or injustice of
specific actions.
The third and final branch of libertarianism is libertarianism as liberty. This
understanding of liberty holds that liberty is the highest value of justice, and that the only way
for a governmental structure to respect that is to allow for free markets and extremely limited
government involvement in individual decision-making.86 This argument has three parts. First,
it holds that “an unrestricted market involves more freedom.”87 Freedom, or liberty, must be the
highest priority of justice because it respects individuals’ right to autonomy and free choice.
Thus, a free market and corollary minimal government obligation is morally obligatory. 88
These three branches of libertarianism have much in common: they all reject proposals of
distributive justice proposed by cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals. Instead, they argue that a
property holder has an absolute right to his or her property. Further, they reject the importance
of a basic structure—domestic or international—in determining background conditions for
justice. While they agree with liberals in that the mechanism for determining a government
structure is contractual, libertarians contend that self-owning individuals would choose principles
of minimalist governance. In addressing global justice, thus, libertarians advocate no
international structures or other norms for affecting the global basic structure, insofar as they
deny its importance, and the legitimacy of attempts to regulate it.
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In the following chapters, I focus primarily on Nozick’s conception of libertarianism,
because it is the most prevalent branches of the theory and most directly and explicitly clashes
with cosmopolitan and Rawlsian liberal accounts of justice. In the next chapter, I will explain
Rawls’s rejection of libertarianism in the domestic case and argue that his acceptance of
libertarian principles in the international case is both inconsistent with his domestic theory of
justice and unsustainably asymmetrical. I hold that Rawls’s reasons for rejecting libertarianism
in the domestic case are sound and ought to be applied to the international realm.

Conclusion
Determining the best way to approach the problem of global justice requires a complete
and nuanced understanding of the concepts, terms, and approaches in the field. Justice
understood in terms of fairness and reciprocity on the global level requires acknowledgment of
the existence and importance of the global basic structure, a network of institutions, practices,
and norms that guide and shape social, political, and economic processes around the globe. The
three primary approaches to solving this problem are Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and
libertarianism. Rawlsian liberalism holds principally that representatives of peoples in a
hypothetical international original position would select principles that balance the value and
importance of human rights with principles of toleration of reasonable pluralism.
Cosmopolitanism differs from Rawlsian liberalism in that the ultimate units of moral concern,
and thus the actors in the original position must be individuals, and that they would choose more
egalitarian principles of mutual cooperation. Conversely, libertarians hold that the principles that
would arise out of any type of social contract would be principles of minimalist government
involvement.
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Importantly, Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism agree on the essential nature of
the basic structure, while libertarians reject distributive justice at both a domestic and
international level based on the belief in individual right to ownership and autonomy. Moreover,
all three approaches agree on the mechanism of a contract, though they come to it from different
perspectives, as well as the centrality of justice in determining the right framework for a global
society. I accept these points of (relative) agreement: the mechanism of the contract, the
centrality of justice, and the importance of the global basic structure. In going forward, thus, I
ask: given the nature of justice and the (empirical or theoretical) nature of the global basic
structure, what principles of mutual cooperation best promote institutional justice on the global
level?
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Chapter 3: A Just Global Basic Structure: Rawlsian Liberalism with a
Cosmopolitan Purpose

Just as justice in a domestic society requires the consideration and regulation of the
domestic basic structure, so too does justice on the international level require dealing with the
reality of a global basic structure. And there is a global basic structure. From buying groceries
to investing in growing international markets, the lives of individuals as well as the actions of
governments are deeply and increasingly tied to global networks that rest upon this basic
structure. Moreover, the existence of the global basic structure is “documented in a vast and
growing interdisciplinary literature that goes under various headings: globalization, structural
dependency, and theory of underdevelopment.”1 Its existence is recognized in the creation of
bodies like the United Nations, NAFTA, and NATO. It is entrenched by international treaties
like the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which holds that “everyone is entitled to a
social and international in order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.”2 The global basic structure is important for two primary reasons. First, it
directly impacts opportunities, resources, and abilities of individuals and states. Second, it
influences the domestic basic structure, further limiting and defining options and abilities of
domestic parties.
The global basic structure has a direct impact on the opportunities of individuals and
states. Trade agreements and tariffs, for example, are all built in the context of the global basic
Buchanan, Allen. 2000. “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World.” Ethics.
Vol. 11, No. 4. 697-721: 706
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structure. International watchdog groups limit the actions of governmental agencies by
publicizing and denouncing human rights abuses. The internet’s ability to facilitate
communications around the world instantaneously has dramatically influenced global culture and
discourse, thereby affecting not just opportunities but cultures, identities, and characters as well.
We live in a deeply and increasingly interconnected world. Any account of global justice must
thus take this into account, for, as Buchanan argues, “there is simply no reason to believe that a
global basic structure that is not regulated by principles of justice will happen to ensure that
every well-governed society will be so distributionally autonomous as to be able to see that …
standards [of justice are] met for all its citizens.”3 Just as we regulate the basic structures of
domestic society in order to ensure fair background conditions, we must similarly regulate the
global basic structure.
Moreover, the global basic structure affects the domestic basic structure, both directly
and indirectly influencing opportunities. This happens in two ways. First, a state that has its
economic growth opportunities benefited by the global basic structure, like the United States or
Europe, reaps social and political benefits as well. Conversely, a state that is systematically
harmed by the global basic structure stands to suffer not only economically but also politically
and socially. For instance, "the probability that democracy survives increases monotonically
with per capita income…No democracy ever fell in a country with a per capita income higher
than that of Argentina in 1975, $6,055."4 In other words, when economic opportunities are
limited by the global basic structure, the just political structure of democracy is unlikely to
obtain. Political and social stability, including Rawls’s “stability for the right reasons,” is
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dependent upon a fair and just global basic structure.5 Second, political and social elements of
the global basic structure influence the opportunities of states, peoples, and individuals.
Consider trade, wherein pressure for free trade which benefits the consumers (generally in the
powerful West) puts pressure on developing nations in regions like Southeast Asia to maintain
low or no minimum wage laws or workplace safety regulations in order to attract business. Even
more perniciously, “relative poverty breeds corruptibility and corruption.”6 In other words, poor
governments “are actively being corrupted, continually and very significantly, by private and
official agents from vastly more wealthy societies.”7 Thus, the global basic structure has indirect
effects on domestic societies, as well as direct effects.
One might argue that even though the world is increasingly interconnected, the global
basic structure is still less pervasive and powerful than domestic structures, and thus does not
need the type of regulation that domestic societies require in order to be just. This
counterargument is flawed for two reasons.8 First, as Charles Beitz notes: “the claim that a
society’s domestic and political character is a more important determinant of individual wellbeing than its international economic position presupposes a capacity to distinguish between
domestic and international influences which may be impossible to sustain.”9 In other words,
because of the interconnected nature of the domestic and global basic structures, whether or not
the ultimate cause of a limitation or opportunity is domestic or global is impossible to determine
in many cases. Regardless, however, the reality of the increasingly interconnected nature of the
global community is sufficient reason to support a theory of international justice that accounts
5
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for a global basic structure. Moreover, the arguments for the existence and influence of the
global basic structure are even stronger now, in 2013 than they were when Pogge or Beitz argued
for recognition of the global basic structure in the 1990s. The rise of the internet age has
accelerated the interconnectedness of information networks, trade networks, and political
alliances. Furthermore, as global climate concerns threaten all states, the global community is
even further incentivized to work together to solve problems that belong not to an individual
society, but to the world at large. Global climate change has international causes and thus
requires international solutions. My argument holds, therefore, because even if I am wrong
about the current existence of the global basic structure, the trajectory of the global community is
increasingly interconnected, and this interconnectedness must be accounted for.
Given the existence of a global basic structure, the questions of distributive justice that
arise in the domestic case because of the domestic basic structure must arise in the international
case. As Buchanan argues, if there is a global basic structure…then surely it is a subject of
justice and a very important one.”10 Thus, schemes of international justice must begin by
recognizing the centrality of the global basic structure.
It is worth, at this point, noting three important facts about the global basic structure.
First, the justice of the global basic structure is prior to social and economic arrangements. A
just global basic structure consists primarily of preventing unjust distributions from occurring,
rather than primarily correcting or compensating for unjust distributions. As Pogge argues:
We should aim for a set of…ground rules under which each participant would be
able to meet her basic social and economic needs…[These] ground rules…are
prior to both production and distribution and therefore involve neither the idea of
an already existing pool of stuff to be doled out nor the idea of already owned
resources to be redistributed.11
10
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A just global basic structure, then, must be established and maintained by institutions and norms
that preexist other contractual agreements, economic exchanges, or political treaties. Liberals
agree on this score. As Pogge notes, "when Rawls claims that economic inequalities prevailing
in developed Western societies are unjust, he is not envisioning that…wealth is to be transferred
or redistributed to the poor. Rather, the point is to change the economic institutions that govern
the distribution of resources (and give rise to excessive inequalities) in the first place."12
Secondly, the global basic structure is multifaceted and multidimensional. Just regulation
of the global basic structure would require regulation of different aspects of social and economic
life. For example, regulatory bodies must monitor, among other things, human rights, trade
agreements, environmental protections, and telecommunications. While the guiding principles
behind these disparate aspects of life are unified, the manifestations of these principles will vary
depending on the realm in which they operate. Thus, in considering the global basic structure, it
is important to remember that it is complicated and multifaceted. The plurality of spheres on
which it operates create different requirements and different structures within the umbrella of the
broad global basic structure.
Third and finally, moral obligations that arise in a global basic structure are not based on
duties of beneficence or charity, but based on common cause. By perpetuating a system that
advantages some at the expense of others, we contribute to the inequalities and injustices in the
global basic structure. Rectifying them, thus, is not charity, but a moral obligation based on
duties of justice and reciprocity. Hence, “we are asked to be concerned about human rights
violations not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are produced by social
institutions in which we are significant participants.”13
12
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Of the three approaches discussed in the previous chapter—Rawlsian liberalism,
cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism—only two capture the existence and significance of the
global basic structure. Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism both understand the essential
nature of a basic structure. Libertarianism, on the other hand, fails to appreciate the moral
significance of the basic structure, so it cannot be the best way to understand and explicate our
obligations. Libertarians assume that our actions are uniquely our own; no external structures
have influence enough over them to mitigate our ownership of ourselves. Yet given the basic
structure, this is simply not true. Actions of individuals and governments are limited by the basic
structure. A child born in Somalia has vastly different chances than a child born in the United
States, because of political, economic, and social factors that have led to advantages or
disadvantages systematically enforced by the global basic structure. Even if Nozick is correct
that an individual may own his or her entire self, including labors and rewards of that labor, this
is still clearly not true for states. As Beitz contends, “we hold individual persons responsible for
the consequences of their own decisions because persons have the capacity for identity over
time—the person who made a decision at one time and who suffers the consequences at a later
time is the same person. But societies are unlike individual persons in this regard.”14 In other
words, even if Nozick’s hard-line individualism applies for individual actions, state actions
cannot be held to the same account, because those who passed policies and those who reap the
rewards or benefits of those policies are not the same. Because libertarianism fails to account for
the centrality of the global basic structure in an account of global justice, it is not an adequate
mechanism to determine justice.
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In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explicitly rejects libertarian arguments. Rawls argues that
libertarianism is illiberal and therefore unacceptable.15 All people are “free and equal” and a just
government must “maintain the conditions for realizing this ideal of persons.”16 In constructing
an understanding of justice in the international sphere, thus, I take Rawls’s criticism of
libertarianism on face, in addition to the arguments presented above. Thus, in determining a
construction of global justice that is consistent with Rawlsian basic principles, I set aside
libertarianism as incapable of dealing with the reality of the global basic structure.
Cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism both have the capacity to consider the
essentialness of the global basic structure. Both account for the reality that shapes and defines
global justice, and both seek justice through the lens of justice-as-fairness that extends across
borders and continents. Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism both understand the essential
nature of a basic structure. For instance, Rawls’s domestic case forbids contracts made under the
context of a coercive basic structure.17 Similarly, cosmopolitans seek to unite the world’s moral
duties precisely because of the pervasive and influencing nature of the global basic structure.
Both of these frameworks are consistent with the framework that Rawls provides in A Theory of
Justice designed to promote justice as fairness. I argue that the best account of global justice can
be reached by achieving a convergence of cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism. Through
this overlapping consensus, international moral obligations can be understood.
There are three questions to be asked in developing and understanding this overlapping
consensus. The first is who are the actors? That is, who gets to decide and agree upon a global
basic structure? On this point, cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals disagree. The second
question is what is the structure? That is, how would the actors develop the principles of
15
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international cooperation and global justice? Third and finally, what are the principles? What
principles, rules, limitations, and guidelines would be established by these actors in this
structure? In this final and most essential question, I argue that cosmopolitans and Rawlsian
liberals would converge and agree.

Actors
There are three potential answers to the question of who the actors might be: individuals,
peoples, and states. Cosmopolitans tend to favor individuals insofar as, for cosmopolitans,
individuals are the ultimate moral unit, the actors to which the benefits of a system of
international system must accrue. Thus, it makes sense for the moral actors to be individuals.
However, holding that the actor in an international cooperation scheme must be the
individual does not follow from the belief that individuals ought be the unit of moral worth.
Even if individuals are the only morally valuable entity, the institutions may be constructed
around different actors. On this account, “there is no inconsistency in holding both that the
ultimate appeal in questions of international justice is to the other interests of individual persons
and that, for political…reasons, we must regard a decentralized world order [the existence of
states] and work for reforms within its basic structure.”18 There is a distinction between the
moral agent—she who the international scheme must protect and whose interests ought be
advanced—and the moral actor—she who directly constructs, regulates, and maintains the
international scheme. It is not necessary to the cosmopolitan account, thus, that individuals be
the actors.
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Thus, some cosmopolitans “make countries, rather than individuals the units.”19 The
reason for this is that individuals are in inefficient and impractical mechanism for constructing an
international order to regulate the global basic structure. Barry compares the use of states in
constructing an international order to the use of families in the domestic case, arguing that even
in a domestic society “we do not really think of the distribution…as a distribution among
individuals but among families.”20 The system of cooperation at the domestic level is among
families, much as, Barry contends, a successful international contract would be between states.21
By distinguishing between moral actors and agents, this distinction is not only possible, but
preferable. Beitz, too, supports this view of cosmopolitanism, arguing that we “conceive of the
international community as a society of (domestic-level) societies characterized by division of
labor: domestic societies are responsible for the well-being of their people.”22 Cosmopolitans,
therefore, may embrace a system of international cooperation that uses states as actors, while
maintaining their ethical emphasis on rights and liberties of individuals.
Cosmopolitans are incentivized to place this emphasis on states because of the pragmatic
benefits of doing so. States are beneficial from two perspectives: implementation and
maintenance. States are the most prevalent actors in the current international system. Thus,
implementing a system of international cooperation is aided by the utilization of the system of
states already in place. In other words, because states are the dominant actors in the existing
global basic structure, as well as schemes of international cooperation already in place, the use of
states as actors makes pragmatic sense in the transition from the current system to a system that
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would create and propagate a just global basic structure. Second, using states aids cosmopolitan
goals of maintenance of a just system of social cooperation on the global level. Tan argues that
it is “within the context of a national culture that the core liberal values of individual autonomy
and self-identity, social justice, and democracy are best realized.”23 States, thus, are useful in that
they demarcate and preserve cultural identities and value systems that promote well-being.
Furthermore, states are uniquely able to understand the culture-specific needs of their citizens,
and create domestic structures accordingly. This is important because it helps promote
reasonable pluralism in the international contract. Pogge contends that "attaining a world of
peace and justice requires widespread acceptance of international pluralism."24 The use of states
as actors is essential to maintaining this reasonable pluralism, because it creates units of
autonomy within the international cooperative scheme. A world state, for instance, cannot
accommodate the same level of reasonable pluralism insofar as it would, as an international
contract does, have only one set of rules and codes at any given time. Its unity is its weakness:
without room for variation, there is no room for pluralism. The use of states solves this problem,
because each state can, within the limits of reasonable pluralism, as discussed later, allow for
variety of cultural ideas, norms, etiquettes, and other values. While institutions of international
justice may distribute sovereignty vertically, the basic unit of states remains. In other words, the
ultimate structure for regulating the global basic structure would more closely resemble the
European Union—wherein individual sovereign states act in coordinated patterns to ensure
mutual benefit—than the United States—wherein states are not truly sovereign and are governed
by a large federal government. The value of states is in their specific abilities and knowledge
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regarding their specific populations. Diffuse sovereignty, then, is important in maintaining the
value of these institutions.
Rawlsian liberals are divided over the appropriate actor for an international contract.
However, they uniformly agree that a world government is not a valuable method for
international cooperation because “we do not need to entertain communitarian fantasies of
culturally and normatively perfectly homogeneous political societies in order to realize that in
political units smaller than the global community it will be easier to find a reasoned consensus on
more specific principles of justice…than on a global scale.”25 Put another way, "a world
government…would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by
frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and
autonomy.”26 However, while Rawlsian liberals agree that there must be some smaller unit of
agency than a world government, there is disagreement about what such units ought be. Most
liberals from the Rawlsian traditions embrace the use of states as actors. Rawls himself,
however, advocates peoples as the actors. I contend that Rawls’s reliance on peoples instead of
states is confusing and unnecessary. Instead, I agree with Hinsch and Buchanan that a liberal
approach is best served by the use of states as the actors.
Rawls argues that:
The term ‘peoples,’… is meant to emphasize these singular features of peoples as
distinct from states, as traditionally conceived, and to highlight their moral
character and the reasonably just, or decent, nature of their regimes. It is
significant that peoples’ rights and duties in regard to their so-called sovereignty
derive from the Law of Peoples itself, to which they would agree along with other
peoples in suitable circumstances. As just or decent peoples, the reasons for their
conduct accord with the corresponding principles. They are not moved solely by
their prudent or rational pursuit interests, the so-called reasons of state.27
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Rawls’s use of ‘peoples’, thus, is meant to emphasize ethical characteristic over the traditionally
non-moral, Westphalian understandings of states. Peoples, on the other hand have “a reasonably
just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests;" are “united
by…common sympathies;” and have “a moral nature”.28 Buchanan further clarifies this
distinction: “for Rawls, peoples are groups with their own states.”29 Thus, we can understand
Rawls’s conception of peoples as moral, united in common sympathies, and contained with and
fully containing of their own state.
Yet this distinction in Rawls is unnecessary. As Buchanan argues, “Rawls courts
confusion: given that the term ‘people’ is often used to refer to ethnic or national groups,
including those that lack their own states.”30 In other words, because ‘peoples’ often means
interstate groups, such as certain Amazonian tribes or the Roma people in Europe, as well as
groups within a state, such as the Catalan people in Spain, Rawls’s definition is counter-intuitive
and not helpful. Rawls makes the distinction between people and state because he wants to hold
the actors in his Law of Peoples to an ethical standard, to duties and obligations that derive from
the Law of Peoples. While this is a noble goal, and, indeed, imperative to any international
scheme, the use of peoples does not advance this aim. I agree with Pogge when he argues that he
“do[es] not believe that the notion of ‘a people’ is clear enough and significant enough in the
human world to play the conceptual role and to have the moral significance that Rawls assigns to
it.” 31 The term peoples, then, breeds confusion, not clarity.
Rawls’s greatest concern with the use of states as the actors is that states are unable to be
held to ethical standards. Yet this is not necessary either empirically or philosophically.
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Empirically, states ratify declarations of human rights, children’s rights, and women’s rights,
they join together into governance bodies like the United Nations to promote welfare and rights,
even limitedly, around the world. Many states even donate some of their wealth to other states in
need.32 These empirical realities demonstrate that states can be moral actors, even in the status
quo. Furthermore, there is nothing philosophically inconsistent with holding states to moral
standards. States are, as cosmopolitans emphasize, ultimately comprised of and answerable to
individuals, which can be held to moral standards. States, being the amalgamations of these
liberal peoples, can thus be held to moral standards on a theoretical level. In other words,
because states are actors comprised of moral agents, they can be held to moral standards.
Rawls’s insistence on the use of peoples, therefore, is unnecessary. As Buchanan articulates, this
insistence is based on an outdated understanding of how state interactions work. The emphasis
on peoples is merely “rules for a vanished Westphalian world,” rather than grounded in the
empirical reality of the world.33
On the question of who ought be the actor in an international cooperation scheme to
regulate the global basic structure, thus, cosmopolitans and liberal converge: states. As Beitz, a
cosmopolitan, contends, “states should count for something in moral reasoning because states are
the most effective political mechanism for protecting human rights, which are themselves preeminently cosmopolitan values.”34 Thus, states ought to be the actor for constructing and
understanding a just international cooperation scheme because, given the existing structure that a
more just system of cooperation would arise from. Tan expresses this idea when he argues “a
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truly liberal nationalism…must also be a cosmopolitan nationalism in the sense that it has to
cohere with the quintessential cosmopolitan principles of normative individualism and ethical
universalism.”35 Furthermore, because of states’ ability to maintain reasonable pluralism within a
scheme of international cooperation, they are uniquely valuable. Rawls’s argument for peoples
unnecessarily convolutes discourse without providing meaningful distinction from states. Thus,
as Hinsch argues, a system of states is preferable to alternatives because they are “internally
regulated by domestic conceptions of justice…[and] would be able to realize locally a degree of
positive autonomy…that no system with only global principles of justice could possibly
achieve.”36 States, therefore, are the best actors for social cooperation.
The second question to be asked is what structure would a social international
cooperative scheme take. In this, like in actors, I argue that cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals
should converge.

Structure
Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans fundamentally agree on the structure that a scheme
of international cooperation would take. Both camps argue that the most successful scheme
would be modeled on a social contract designing and maintaining the global basic structure. In
this sense, they are all Rawlsian, seeking to apply the principles of justice that Rawls articulates
in A Theory of Justice for the domestic case in some sense to the international community. The
value of an international social contract is that it “focuses on the fundamental 'rules of the game'
and not on what rules players are morally free or constrained to make within a particular game in
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progress.”37 That is, it is valuable insofar as it does not require absolute justice in every single
human interaction—an impossible goal—but rather seeks to create a just global basic structure
upon which just interactions can occur. As discussed above, without such justice in the
background conditions, institutions and interactions cannot be fair, and hence not just.
What would such an international social contract look like? That is, what structure would
it take? Rawls approaches this question as an extension of his domestic case: “apply the two
principles to the basic structure of a national society, and then reconvene the parties for a second
session to deal with the relations among such societies.”38 This reconvening would be done
through representatives of individual societies behind a veil of ignorance. Similar to the
domestic case, representatives of societies “know nothing about the particular circumstances of
their own society, its power and strength in comparison with other nations, nor do they know
their place in their own society.”39 This two-fold level of blindness is important. First, the
representatives do not know the particulars of their own society. They do not know if they are
economic superpowers, or developing nations dependent upon the aid of other states. They do
not know if they have vast mineral or oil deposits, seaports, or industrialized power grids. They
are ignorant both of the domestic particulars of their own society as well how those particulars
compare to and relate to the particulars of other societies. This is important because it creates
conditions under which, as in the domestic case, considerations of economic inequalities might
arise. Second, the representatives of states are unaware of their own place in society. This is
important because it incentivizes consideration not just of the elite or ruling class, but of greater
social considerations in constructing rules of egalitarian social interaction. Put together, this
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two-fold veil of ignorance ensures, as Buchanan argues, “parties representing peoples strive to
ensure that their societies are not disadvantaged by the global basic structure.”40
One point of disagreement between Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans is what
considerations delegates in this position would bring to the structure of an international contract.
Rawls assumes that delegates are uniquely concerned with being a just liberal society, rather than
with considerations of egalitarianism.41 Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, hold that “each
delegate assumes that her people has an ultimate interest not only in the justice of its domestic
institutions, but also in the well-being of its members.”42 Put another way, “because the parties in
the domestic original position are represented as ‘free and equal’, they will avoid principles that
might turn out to assign them to an inferior status.”43 On this account, representatives of states
enter into a second, international original position and select principles that promote the wellbeing of their citizens and society. These representatives are concerned not with merely being
“constituted as a just liberal society,” but also broader egalitarian principles.44
However, Rawls’s initial rejection of an egalitarian conception of global justice only
makes sense without an understanding of the global basic structure’s importance. Modern
Rawlsian liberals such as Allen Buchanan and Wilfried Hinsch who take the global basic
structure into account endorse a much more egalitarian structure with broader considerations for
the international social contract. Rawls’s insistence that representatives would only be
interested in a very narrow set of considerations is based on Rawls’s failure to adequately
appreciate the significance of the global basic structure. In other words, “Rawls simply assumes
that it is only ‘the basic structure of their society’ that is relevant to whether a people prospers or
40

Buchanan 2000 708
Rawls 1999 86
42
Pogge 1994 208
43
Buchanan 2000 708
44
Pogge 1994 208
41

Fetrow 55

not.”45 However, because “like a domestic global structure, the global basic structure in part
determines the prospects [of states]…It is therefore unjustifiable to ignore the global basic
structure in a moral theory of international law.”46 Since representatives of states would want to
ensure that their people have the ability to be liberal, they would necessarily be concerned with
the global basic structure, because of the effect that it has on domestic opportunities as described
above. Thus, a Rawlsian liberal interpretation must consider not merely in maintaining a
particular conception of domestic justice. For Rawls, thus, in order for principles to “satisfy the
criterion of reciprocity, since this criterion holds at both [the domestic and international] levels,”
broader egalitarian concerns must be considered.47 Thus, the structure of a global moral order
would include egalitarian considerations.
Thus, cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals should converge, given the importance of the
global basic structure. The structure of global cooperation takes representatives of states, who
neither know their own position in society, nor their society’s position in relation to other
societies, who are concerned with both their state’s ability to address fundamental questions of
domestic justice, and also considerations of economic equality between states, given the
pervasive influence of the global basic structures. The principles of social cooperation,
therefore, derive from this basis, and must reflect both concerns for preserving state conceptions
of justice and broader inter-state concerns of social and economic justice.

General Principles
Thus far, I have demonstrated that, given the existence and importance of the global basic
structure, cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism have the capacity to incorporate an
45
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understanding of the reality of our interconnected world, and accept the implications of this
pervasive global basic structure on a system of global justice as fairness. Further, I have
demonstrated that both cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals should prefer a social contract
between representatives of states in an original position in order to promote rights and wellbeing
while still pragmatically promoting reasonable pluralism. The next question, thus, is what
general principles would derive from such a structure. In this section, I explore the general
principles, arguing that cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals would agree to principles of
distributive justice given the existence of the global basic structure. In the next chapter, I explore
these general principles in more detail, explaining several more pragmatic implications of the
general, ideal theory I put forth here.
In determining principles of a cooperative international scheme, justice must be at the
forefront. Inequalities must be justifiable and reasonable based on principles of justice. Put
another way, “we [Americans]…need to justify to a Mexican why we should be entitled to life
prospects that are so much superior to hers merely because we were born on the other side of
some line—a difference that, on the face of it, is not less morally arbitrary than differences in
sex, in skin color, or in the affluence of one’s parents.”48
There are three primary questions in determining what broad principles would promote
global justice at the intersection of Rawlsian liberal and cosmopolitan views:
1.) What are the principles of membership?
2.) What are the principles that limit state actions?
3.) What are the principles that guide resource distribution?
The first question asks if only liberal states, in the Rawlsian sense, can be included, or if other
types of states such as decent hierarchical, outlaw, or burdened may or even must be included.
48
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The second question asks about the limits of reasonable pluralism in a system of global justice
and determines the role of human rights in international justice. The third question asks what
obligations of distribution and resource management global justice requires, that is, whether vast
economic or social inequalities can be tolerated, and to what extent, in a just global contract.

Principles of Membership
The first question is: what principles of membership limit or expand the bounds of global
justice? What types of states ought, or must be included? I accept Rawls’s categories of states:
liberal, decent, burdened, outlaw, and benevolent absolutisms. Though for Rawls both ‘liberal’
and ‘decent’ are properly attributed to peoples not states, I, for the reasons articulated above,
apply these labels to states. A liberal state, like a liberal people, has legitimate liberal
constitutions, common sympathies, and moral nature.49 It is clear from a cosmopolitan
perspective that burdened societies ought be included. Further, I argue that once a Rawlsian
liberal account considers the global basic structure, it must likewise naturally include burdened
states within the international contract.
A cosmopolitan’s purpose for including burdened states in the international structure of
justice is clear: if individuals are the units of moral worth, then the fact than they are born in
burdened societies rather than liberal or decent ones is irrelevant to our egalitarian duties to
them. The international social contract must include them, therefore, because of the nature of the
egalitarian duties that the contract seeks to protect. Moreover, if an international original
position is to encompass human rights, it must, by necessity, be universal. As Bietz explains,
“the exclusion of outlaw (and other) societies from the international original position means that
no argument for human rights, made from the point of view of the original position, could
49
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establish that human rights have the kind of universality that is usually presumed.”50 In other
words, in order for the rights articulated by the international contract to be universal,
membership in the contract must likewise be universal. Because cosmopolitans care about the
rights and welfare of every individual, cosmopolitans hold that concern for the subjects of nonliberal peoples necessitates their inclusion in the international social contract. This means that
non-liberal peoples must be included. Thirdly, given that the global basic structure affects all
societies, a system of international justice that regulates it must consider and take into account all
affected parties, including and even particularly burdened societies who most directly suffer as a
result of any injustices and inequalities in the global basic structure.
This last point is also key for a Rawlsian perspective. I argue that a Rawlsian liberal
account must include not only liberal and decent societies, but also burdened states, outlaw
states, and benevolent absolutisms because of the global basic structure. Rawls explicitly
advocates a minimal duty to aid for burdened states, with the aim of bringing burdened societies
into the international community more fully.51 This implies that Rawls should want burdened
societies included in the international contract, because the best chance of promoting human
rights and political justice and stability can occur within the context of the international
contract’s regulatory powers. Similarly, Rawlsian liberals should advocate that outlaw states
ought not be tolerated in their outlaw form, and be forced towards liberal or at least decent
structures in order to be included.52 Because Rawlsian liberals are concerned with the integrity of
the state, they should include non-liberal states. Thus, like cosmopolitans, Rawlsian liberals
ought advocate a broad understanding of what kinds of states ought be members of an
international contract.
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Furthermore, from an original position, representatives of outlaw and other nonliberal
states would not know the structure of their society, and thus would not know they were
nonliberal. Given this limitations, representatives of all states would want to be included within
the international contract, because of the pervasive power of the global basic structure. In other
words, because the global basic structure has such a pervasive influence on a domestic society’s
economic, social, and political opportunities, it is in the best interest of all states to participate in
order to promote their own state interest. In self-interest, then, nonliberal states would seek to be
included in the global basic structure.
Moreover, it is structurally possible to include non-liberal peoples in the international
contract, because, as Buchanan explains:
Regardless of whether one represents a people whose internal conception of
justice is egalitarian or hierarchical, one’s commitment to protecting both the
capacity of one’s society to implement its conception of justice and one’s
commitment to securing equal status in the international community for one’s
society require the choice of principles of justice for the global basic structure.53

In other words, because all states want to advance themselves and their interests, they
need not be liberal in order to choose just principles in guiding their interactions with other
states. Thus, “representatives of inegalitarian societies would choose principles for the law of
peoples that express the equality of peoples.”54 It is thus structurally possible, as well as
philosophically necessary, to include nonliberal peoples in an international contract of global
justice.
However, it is important to note that not all states need be included in regulatory and
governing institutions of international justice simply because they are part of the original social
contract. While outlaw states and illiberal states have incentives to participate in the original
53
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position and to craft just policies, these incentives are premised upon their position behind the
veil of ignorance. Illiberal and outlaw states are not appropriate actors for designing the
institutions that realize the principles of global justice outside of the original position. Certain
limits, thus, may be imposed on standing as full and equal members of the international
community that require that outlaw states and illiberal states liberalize and accept certain norms,
such as human rights, in order to participate fully. These limits also regulate and restrict the
actions of states of all types may take against their own people. Below, I explore what these
limits might entail.

Principles of Limits
Of course, including such a variety of types of states who have differing conceptions of
human rights, or perhaps do not even acknowledge human rights, raises questions for reasonable
pluralism. Thus, the second question in determining the principles that derive from an
international social contract is: What are the limits of reasonable pluralism in a system of global
justice? I contend that both cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals would agree that reasonable
pluralism within the bounds of human rights must be not only tolerated, but accepted and even
encouraged.
Rawls argues that “reasonable pluralism is not to be regretted…[because] given the
socially feasible alternatives, the existence of pluralism allows a society of greater political
justice and liberty.”55 Reasonable pluralism allows for societies to pursue different conceptions
of justice within their societies, while agreeing to principles of justice that guide their
international cooperation. As Rawls argues, “the existence of pluralism allows a society of
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greater political justice and liberty.”56 Importantly, however, the doctrines allowed by a
reasonable pluralism must be such that each must still see the others as viable and sensible
alternatives to their own perspectives.57 Pluralism, thus, is central to a Rawlsian account.
Cosmopolitans, too, embrace reasonable pluralism in an international contract. Pogge
argues that “institutional moral cosmopolitanism is committed to the freedom of individual
persons and therefore envisions a pluralist global order.”58 In other words, because
cosmopolitans embrace the individual as the ultimate moral unit, and pluralism is the result of
free choices of individuals and the communities they create, a system of international justice
must allow for reasonable pluralism.
However, both accounts agree that human rights “set limit to the pluralism among
peoples."59 Pogge holds that:
We should conceive human rights primarily as claims on coercive social
institutions and secondarily as claims against those who uphold such institutions.
Such an institutional understanding goes beyond an interactional one, which
presents human rights as placing the treatment of human of human beings under
certain constraints that do not presuppose the existence of social institutions.60
Like the distinction between interaction and institutional cosmopolitanism61, this conception of
human rights emphasizes the relation of institutions to rights, rather than specific, individual
actions. Put another way, “human rights are primarily supposed to govern how all of us together
ought to design the basic rules of our common life.”62 They are central to the cosmopolitan
account of global justice because they protect the individuals that are at the heart of the

56

Ibid.
Ibid. 29
58
Pogge 2008 199
59
Rawls 1999 80
60
Pogge 2008 51
61
See Literature Review
62
Pogge 2008 53
57

Fetrow 62

cosmopolitan account. Pogge subscribes to a broad account of human rights such as outlined in
the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63 This includes “secure access to
minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter,
education, and health care.”64 Human rights therefore provide limits to pluralism insofar as
pluralism is only ‘reasonable’ and therefore allowable when it is within the confines of human
rights. This is a narrow interpretation of pluralism but, as Pogge contends, human rights must be
the ultimate goal. Pluralism is a value in that it helps advance that goal. When it is instead in
opposition to human rights, pluralism, not rights, must be set aside.
Human rights are also central to a Rawlsian liberal account. However, in contrast to the
expansive cosmopolitan view of rights, Rawls’s view of rights is restricted to “a special class of
urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of
conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”65 This is importantly
different from a cosmopolitan account because of the notable absence of any mention of
economic or social rights. However, simply because the definition of human rights is narrower
does not mean that the Rawlsian account values them any less. Rawls writes that fulfillment of
human rights “is a necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political institutions and of
its legal order.”66 Because Rawls’s definition of human rights is narrow, therefore, the Rawlsian
approach to the constraints on reasonable pluralism is very different than the cosmopolitan
approach.
However, Rawls’s minimal approach to human rights exists without consideration of the
global basic structure. If there were no global basic structure, this narrowness would make
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sense: if the international structure has no influence over economic or social circumstance, then
requiring the international contract’s structure to account for social and economic rights is both
impossible and fruitless. However, the global basic structure does exist, and it does have serious
and lasting consequences on social and economic orders. Because of this, representatives of
states in the international social contract would want to consider their society’s economic and
social abilities and opportunities. They would want to ensure their access to these things by
articulating broader rights than the ones that Rawls explicitly mentions, even if that meant
limiting their rights to pluralism. In other words, the global basic structure has a profound
impact on the opportunities and abilities of domestic societies, both directly and by influencing
the domestic basic structure.67 Because of this, the rights that representatives would articulate in
an international original position on a Rawlsian liberal account would converge with
cosmopolitan account of rights: broader, more inclusive, and more egalitarian. Reasonable
pluralism, therefore, is limited by egalitarian rights that include social and economic rights, in
addition to Rawls’s class of ‘urgent’ rights.
While the specific content of a doctrine of human rights is beyond my scope, the
framework for evaluating whether a claim constitutes a right derives from the international
original position. Charles Beitz compellingly proposes that human rights would be the result of
an overlapping consensus whose boundaries are set not by “the philosophical or moral beliefs
that actually prevail in the world’s major cultures…but rather by the best available elaboration of
the basic normative materials of these cultures for the circumstances of modern life.”68 In other
words, the consensus that forms the foundation for a doctrine of human rights is premised upon
hypothetical agreement, not actual agreement. Though Beitz does not make this point explicitly,
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the implication of this is that a doctrine of human rights must derive from the international
original position. Therefore, in the original position, human rights claims are to be considered
according to the three principles described above.
Again, it is beyond my scope here to consider in too great of depth what claims could
properly be considered ‘rights’. However, I want to indicate a preliminary discussion of what
types of claims might be included. Beitz advances one schema that is valuable for this purpose.
He proposes that a justified claim for human rights would have three parts:
1. That the interest that would be protected by the right is sufficiently important
when reasonably regarded from the perspective of those protected that it
would be reasonable to consider its protection to be a priority.
2. That it would be advantageous to protect the underlying interest by means of
legal or policy instruments available to the state.
3. That in the central range of cases in which a state might fail to provide the
protection, the failure would be a suitable object of international concern.69

The first principle serves to demonstrate that the claim, when deprived, constitutes a negative
impact on one’s life. This can occur in a number of ways. The claim may be, for instance,
“sufficiently generic that it would be reasonable to expect anyone to recognize their importance
(e.g. the interests in physical security and adequate nutrition).”70 Interesting, these rights are
prior to Rawls’s urgent rights. Bodily integrity, preserved by access to nutrition and physical
security, is a necessary precondition to liberty of conscious or freedom from serfdom. While
Rawls’s claim that the security of minority groups from genocide is an urgent right, it is merely
an aspect of a broader conception of a right to physical safety. Put another way, human rights
must be universal, and, as such, a right to physical security cannot just apply to minority groups,
but must apply to all individuals. Other forms of human rights, Beitz contends, are abstracted to
a level where (nearly) everyone would agree to them, such as freedom to follow one’s religion,
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or derived from other interests, such as a right to vote may be derived from a right to political
participation.71 The common feature that underlies these different justifications for human rights
is “that the importance of the interest, seen from the standpoint of the reasonable beneficiary,
should be intelligible to reasonable persons who might be called upon to protect it.”72 This
conception of human rights, so understood, is best articulated and justified in the international
original position, because it requires that a rights claim be intelligible without reference to selfinterest.
There is much disagreement about the content of a doctrine of human rights. While
some, like Pogge, advocate a very broad interpretation of human rights akin to those delineated
in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, this expansive conception is widely
disputed. However, as long as we accept that there ought be at least some conception of human
rights, it seems quite clear that the most foundational necessities to human existence would be
protected under this conception of human rights. Adequate food, water, healthcare, or shelter is
a precursor to what might be considered ‘higher-level’ rights. Put another way, I cannot
meaningfully pursue my religion, participate in the political process, or pursue my conception of
the good life if I am fully occupied by trying to survive. As Henry Shue argues, “No one can
fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the
essentials for a reasonably healthy and active life.”73 What higher-level rights might also be
included in a doctrine of human rights established by the international original position I set
aside here, suffice to say that if a claim is to be considered a right, it must satisfy the criteria here
established. That is, a right must be recognized as such by participants in the international social
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contract. Furthermore, as any claim of ‘right’ is considered, its corollary effect on pluralism
must likewise be considered. These two considerations, taken together, provide the limits both
for each other and for global justice.

Principles of Distribution
The final structural question asks what obligations of distribution and resource
management global justice requires, that is, whether vast economic or social inequalities can be
tolerated, and to what extent, in a just global contract. I call this question a question of principles
of distribution. There are two potential broad principles of distribution that I will consider in
contrasting Rawlsian and cosmopolitan accounts of global justice: a minimal standard akin to
Rawls’s duty of assistance or the broader standard of Rawls’s domestic difference principle.74
Cosmopolitans embrace the second approach. I argue that, though Rawls explicitly embraces the
first approach, Rawlsian liberalism must embrace the second approach when the global basic
structure is taken into account. Given the centrality of the global basic structure, and the
implications of the global basic structure on understandings of human rights, it is clear that there
must be substantial principles of economic aid and distributive shares in some sense. Because a
global basic structure results in economic advantages to some states and disadvantages to others,
a just structure must distribute inequalities justly.
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In the domestic case, Rawls argues compellingly for a democratic interpretation of justice
that “is arrived at by combining the principle of fair equality of opportunity with the difference
principle…The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more
attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less
fortunate.”75 In other words, in the domestic case, Rawls advocates the combination of fair
equality of opportunity, which holds that “each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”76 Thus, a basic structure
must be such that all persons have access to basic liberties, which, according to Rawls, include
“rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth.”77 Yet Rawls acknowledges
that this is not sufficient, by itself, to ensure a justice society. After all, we are all born subject to
natural and social lotteries, which have implications for our outcomes. For example, if I am born
with a low IQ, or handicapped, my potential is different from someone not so afflicted.
Similarly, if I am born to a wealthy family able to afford to send me to the best schools, I am
better situated than if I am born to a poor family who cannot afford these advantages. Rawls
argues that these lotteries are equally arbitrary. That is, I can no more help the social situation to
which I am born than I can help my natural features. Thus, if I accept that unequal, or at least
dissimilar, results based on one type of lottery are unjust, I must equally accept that the other is
unjust. In other words, if I accept that different life prospects based on immutable characteristics
like race or gender are unjust, I must similarly accept that different life prospects based on
familial wealth are unjust, and vice versa.78 Thus, Rawls holds in the domestic case that “it
seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in
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the distribution of native endowments, any more than one deserves one’s initial stating place in
society.”79
The difference principle follows from this because it constructs a society wherein “gains
are not made at others’ expense...”80 In other words, the difference principle serves to mitigate
the injustices of the natural and social lottery because “those who have been favored by
nature…may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who
have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted…” 81
Thus, within the context of the domestic sphere, sheer luck is not a justified or justifiable reason
to allow for inequalities.
Rawls’s emphasis on regulating the social structure in order to advance a society that is
not only efficient but also just leads to his rejection a system of natural liberty. He argues:
In the system of natural liberty the distribution is regulated by the arrangements
implicit in the conception of careers open to talents. These arrangements
presuppose a background of equal liberty….They require a formal equality of
opportunity in that all have at least the same level rights of access to all
advantaged social positions. But since there is no effort to preserve an equality, or
similarity, of social conditions, except insofar as this is necessary to preserve the
requisite background institutions, the initial distribution of assets for any period of
time is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies…the most obvious
injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be
improperly influenced by…factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.82
Importantly, in this conception Rawls emphasizes that it is the basic structure—society’s
influence on the individual’s choices—that render the system of natural liberty unjust. In other
words, what makes this potential system unfair is that it does not account for the influence that
society has on one’s choices. Therefore, one’s options and potentials are not entirely one’s own,
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they are shaped and limited by the basic structure. Regulation of the basic structure in the form
of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle is therefore necessary.
Central to Rawls’s domestic theory, therefore, is that:
The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make
the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends
in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can
claim no credit….Thus the more advantaged representative man cannot say that
he deserves and therefore has a right to a scheme of cooperation in which he is
permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do not contribute to the welfare of
others…From the standpoint of common sense, then, the difference principle
appears to be acceptable both to the more advantaged and to the less advantaged
individual.83
Rawls’s defense of the difference principle, which maximizes the distributive share of the least
well-off, is one of the most important and influential elements of his theory of (domestic) justice.
However, Rawls explicitly rejects the difference principle in the international case in
favor of a minimal standard he calls the duty of assistance. He holds that “the levels of wealth
and welfare among societies may vary, and presumably do so; but adjusting those levels is not
the object of the duty of assistance. Only burdened societies need help.”84 In other words, the
only requirement in a just international social contract is minimal duties to burdened societies to
allow them to establish a liberal or decent political culture. He believes that "political culture of
a burdened society is all-important,” and that is disassociated from economic prosperity.85
Because political culture is the only “crucial element in how a country fares…and not the level
of its resources, the arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources causes no difficulty.”86
Beitz expands on this idea, arguing that, because “the parties to the international original position
would know that natural resources are distributed unevenly over the Earth’s surface…the parties
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would view the distribution of resources much as Rawls says the parties to the domestic original
position…view the distribution of natural talents.”87 Thus, Rawls concludes, the distributive
principles chosen by the representatives in the international original position would be the
minimalistic duty to assist burdened societies, rather than more egalitarian duties.
However, even if it were true that a society could be liberal, successful, and just with
essentially no resources, the fact that the people within that society are poorer, and thus have
fewer opportunities, less access to healthcare, adequate nutrition, clean water, or education
renders such inequalities unjust. Moreover, if these inequalities derive from an unjust global
basic structure, differences in outcomes are not Rawls claims, ‘arbitrary’. Rather, it is the result
of systematic injustices in the international system. Whether a state has access to resources or
not is not the only nor even the main reason for a country’s economic success. This has been
demonstrated through research in fields such as economic development literature and resource
curse theory.88 Wealth and income are important in assuring welfare and access to political,
economic, and social opportunities. As Hinsch explains, “income and wealth are all-purpose
means that have instrumental value for individuals irrespective of their more comprehensive
conceptions of life in all sorts of social environments.”89 In other words, without access to a
certain amount of economic resources, none of the rights that Rawlsian liberalism wants to
protect can be preserved or promoted. Put another way:
Being well-governed does not ensure that a society will be able to provide a
decent and worthwhile life for all members nor that its distinctive conception of
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justice or the good can be adequately implemented. A well-governed society
might be seriously disadvantaged by the global basic structure…90

Thus, economic considerations and justice must be considered not only to promote political
justice, but also intrinsically because of the effects that the global basic structure has on
economic opportunities, or the lack thereof, of some states. Moreover, because as Rawls himself
admits, human rights include “the means of subsistence.”91 Because the global basic structure
can have a negative impact on these means of subsistence, it must therefore regulate it not only
in cases of burdened societies, but wherever it causes injustices.
Note that in the domestic case Rawls calls it “fixed” that the particular circumstances of
one’s family is insufficient justification for rejecting the difference principle.92 Yet as I have
already argued, the state into which one is born is just as important as one’s family. If I am
female born into a culture which does not allow women to attend school, my options are limited
by that society. If I am born into a state wherein I do not have access to healthcare, clean water,
or a secure food supply, my options are incredibly affected. Just as in the domestic case one’s
family is both morally arbitrary and incredibly influential to one’s opportunities for success, so
too is one’s state. For Rawls to ignore the centrality of the state in determining one’s outcomes
grievously undermines his account of international justice, because it treats kinds that are alike in
this regard—states and families—as unlike. This comparison between states and families
provides further reason for Rawls’s difference principle to be applied on the international level in
order for his theories of justice to be internally consistent.
In defense of his minimalist duty of assistance, Rawls gives two cases that he believes
demonstrate that a more egalitarian distributive principle would be unjust. The first is of two
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countries of equal wealth, one of which industrializes and prospers, the other which does not.93
According to Rawls, asking the country that succeeded to continually flow taxes to the less
successful country is “unacceptable.”94 Similarly, if a country provides “elements of equal
justice for women” and benefits as a result, and another does not, the first should not be required
to aid the second.95
The problem with these examples is that they presume that states operate in a vacuum,
that their successes are entirely determined by their own actions. However, given the global
basic structure, this is untrue. The industrial society’s ability to sell its produce, for example, is
dependent upon the international community being willing to purchase its products, or upon parts
and equipment produced in other countries being available. At a very basic level, then, a state’s
economic success is not the result of simply its own efforts, but dependent upon the global basic
structure.
Moreover, as Barry points out, “there is no country that is well off by world
standards…in which the current generation can claim all the credit for their prosperity.”96 In
other words, “saying ‘we deserve it because we worked for it’ is never strictly true, unless the
‘we’ is tacitly extended back to earlier generations.”97 Thus, even if Rawls is correct that the
success of these states is uniquely dependent upon their domestic policies, the particular
individuals who institute a policy are typically not those who reap the benefits. Similarly, a
country that is not well-off (the second countries in each of Rawls’s scenarios) is poorly off not
only through its own actions, but the construct of the global basic structure.
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Rawls’s reasons for advocating a minimal principle of distribution, therefore, are
rendered unreasonable given the existence of a global basic structure. Rawls’s failure to include
egalitarian distributive principles is based on the fact that he ignores the global basic structure.
The alternative is that which Rawls himself proposes in the domestic case: the broader standard
of distributive obligations that Rawls calls the difference principle. Indeed, Rawlsian liberals
who accept and embrace the global basic structure similarly embrace principles of justice akin to
Rawls’s domestic case. For example, Barry argues, “if Rawls’s arguments for the difference
principle…are valid at all, then it would seem that we can argue immediately that they should be
applied globally.”98 Thus, the global basic structure, like the domestic basic structure, has the
potential to:
(1) [fail] to give members of different peoples roughly equal chances to influence
the transnational political decisions that shape their lives. (2) …[fail] to give [the]
equally talented and motivated … roughly equal chances … (3) [and generate]
international social and economic inequalities that are not to the maximum benefit
of the world’s worst-off...99
In other words, because the global basic structure has the power to create economic inequalities
analogous to the inequalities caused by the basic structure in the domestic case, Rawlsian liberal
must embrace egalitarian principles of distribution like the difference principle that they embrace
in the domestic case both in order to be consistent with their own philosophical stance, and also
to have a chance of achieving the aims of their political theory, which are, as Rawls holds, to
extend justice as fairness to international law.100 Therefore, as Pogge argues, “Those who are
really committed to a liberal conception of justice will envision a law of peoples which demands
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that persons everywhere enjoy the protection of the full list of human rights as well as adequate
opportunities and material means that are not radically unequal.”101
Rawlsian liberal advocacy of egalitarian principles of distribution further makes sense
given the discussion of liberal human rights I discuss above. Recall that, given the influence of
the global basic structure, representatives of states would choose principles of rights that
consider their society’s economic status comparative to other states. Thus, the conception of
human rights that would be articulated by the representatives of states in the international
original position necessitates egalitarian principles of redistribution. In other words, because
representatives behind the veil of ignorance would not know if their society would be greatly
advantaged or disadvantaged economically by the original position, they would select principles
of distribution that would protect the least well-off states in order to promote their own society’s
economic status.
Cosmopolitans naturally embrace these broader egalitarian principles of distribution.
Because cosmopolitans value the welfare of the individual, massive economic inequalities, and
the suffering that arises from them, are unacceptable. Put another way, the centrality of the
concern for welfare and human rights in a cosmopolitan account means that dramatic economic
inequalities that derive from and are sustained by the global basic structure which cosmopolitans
(and Rawlsian liberals) seek to regulate means that the principle of distribution that would derive
from an international social contract would be broad egalitarian principles, rather than narrow
principles.
Interestingly, the difference principle can also be reached through a libertarian
perspective, even though libertarians like Nozick actively and emphatically reject it. Nozick’s
own theory can create a difference principle through Nozick’s use of the Lockean proviso.
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According to Locke, appropriation of raw materials is acceptable when “enough and as good” is
left for others.102 In other words, principles of distribution are just when they are “consistent with
the equality of other individuals,” and do not make them worse-off.103 Nozick offers an
interpretation of the Lockean proviso that creates limits on actions as limiting others’ rights.
According to Nozick, to worsen the condition of others has two features. First, he “defines
‘worse-off’ in terms of material welfare…[second] it defines pre-appropriation common usage as
the standard of comparison.104 However, as Kymlicka points out, Nozick compares only two
possibilities: a Lockean state of nature, and a libertarian capitalism where one may sell their
labor or starve. But “these are not the only two options that are relevant to judgments about the
legitimacy of appropriation. It is absurd to say that a person who starves to death is not made
worse off by Nozick’s system of appropriation when there are other systems in which that person
would not have died.”105 Nozick, therefore, must deal with these possibilities, and compare a
libertarian model of just appropriations to other alternatives, not merely to a state of nature. Yet,
as Kymlicka notes, even though everyone might be better off in a different scheme, not everyone
can be entitled to a world “maximally adapted to their best interest.”106 Therefore, a middle
ground must be achieved that benefits all. John Arthur argues that the only distribution that
makes sense, given this proviso, then, is that each person “is as entitled to the resources as
anybody else.”107 Therefore, any inequalities in the system that must seek to promote this equal
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entitlement, and therefore any inequalities must go to the benefit of the least well-off.108 Given
the Lockean proviso, therefore, the difference principle is derivable even from a libertarian
perspective. This is significant because it demonstrates that the convergence of Rawlsian liberal
and cosmopolitan approaches on the difference principle is not the only way to derive this
principle. The fact that the primary opponent of my proposal within the framework of justice
could also derive the principles I propose here further indicates that the converge that I
demonstrate is a reasonable and, indeed, necessary extension of the role and scope of justice.
How the principles I describe would manifest varies slightly between theorists, but the
core principle of broad egalitarian distribution remains the same. For example, Pogge calls for a
global resource tax that taxes consumption and uses the funds raised to aid those least well-off.109
Similarly, Beitz calls for distributive justice and duties of assistance to ensure reciprocity. 110
Barry contends that individuals in a global original position would choose principles that include
equal rights to natural resources, taxes on resource extraction, and international income tax on
gross domestic product.111 Despite these differences in application, the general principle of
egalitarian distributive principles remains unchanged. The reasons for variations of application
are primarily empirical. Cosmopolitans agree that the application of these general principles
must be pragmatic. As Barry notes, “a transfer which increases resources (either of an individual
or a collectivity) but which does not relieve suffering of some person or persons has not achieved
its end.”112 Thus, the variations between cosmopolitan accounts of global justice reflect
empirical disagreements, rather than theoretical ones. Moreover, these empirical differences
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make sense in the context of a rapidly changing world. Barry, writing in 1980, would naturally
have different recommendations than would Pogge writing in 2008, as nearly thirty years had
elapsed between the two writings. On the general principles, however, cosmopolitans agree.
Thus, cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals should converge on the principles of
distribution that would derive from an international social contract of representatives of states.
Once the importance of the global basic structure is considered, the Rawlsian adherence to a
minimal distributive scheme crumbles, and Rawlsian liberals should converge on a global
difference principle.

Conclusion
The global basic structure’s profound and broad-reaching impact on both domestic basic
structures and the access of societies to opportunities and advancement has implications for the
supposed tensions and conflicts between cosmopolitanism and liberalism. In addition, it renders
inapplicable libertarianism for a scheme of international justice because libertarianism cannot
account for the global basic structure.
Though cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals approach the question of global justice from
different perspectives, they ultimately converge on the actors, structure, and even principles of
global justice. As Tan puts it, “once the goals and content of cosmopolitanism global justice, on
the one hand, and the parameters of liberal nationalism, on the other, are properly defined and
identified, the perceived conflict between [liberalism]…and cosmopolitanism disappears.”113
Thus, an account of global justice that is cognizant of the influence and scope of the global basic
structure would consist of representatives of states who, in an international original position,
select broad principles of membership, human rights, and distribution for the international order.
113
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Chapter 4: Towards a Realistic Utopia: Implications and Results

I have advanced an account of global justice in the context of cosmopolitan and Rawlsian
liberal frameworks that considers both theoretical understandings of the actors, structures, and
principles that would derive from an international social contract as well as the empirical realities
of our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. However, even within the
contractarian framework through which I work, my approach is not without objections. At the
heart of the objections I propose here is the question of whether the approach I advocate
advances a truly realistic utopia. This is at the heart of a Rawlsian approach, for in The Law of
Peoples, Rawls “begin[s] and end[s] with the idea of a realistic utopia.”1 This questions
manifests in two primary objections:
1.) Is implementation of the principles I have proposed here possible?
2.) Are the principles that I propose sustainable?
The implementation objection argues that the principles of international justice articulated here
would never be achieved, because the empirical reality of power in the world would never allow
for distributive justice or principles of cooperation that benefited the least well-off. The
sustainability objection holds that the principles argued for here, even if implemented, would
result in unacceptable or impractical outcomes and would collapse in on themselves.
A second type of objection rejects the centrality of the global basic structure. This
objection, called the interconnectivity objection, holds that despite increasing connectedness, the
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world is still not so interconnected that parallels may be drawn between the domestic basic
structure, which clearly influences people’s potential outcomes, and the global basic structure.

The Implementation Objection
The implementation objection goes as follows: given the power structure in the status
quo, wealthy states would never allow the scheme of international justice I propose here to be
implemented. Thus, my proposal is insufficient to create a realistic utopia, and the principles I
argue for are non-Rawlsian, because Rawls emphasizes the value of a realistic utopia. As I
demonstrate below, this argument is flawed because it is unduly pessimistic about the trajectory
of international relations.
Central to Rawls’s political philosophy is that he seeks to describe and advocate a
realistic utopia. According to Rawls:
Political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily
thought of as the limits of practical political possibility. Our hope for the future
of our society rests on the belief that the nature of the social world allows
reasonably just constitutional democratic societies existing as members of the
Society of Peoples…The idea of this society is realistically utopian in that it
depicts an achievable social world that combines political right and justice for
all.2
In other words, a political philosophy may be considered realistic if it does not require actions or
institutions that go beyond what would be considered reasonable and rational to just
constitutional democratic societies. This view is deeply tied to the conception of political
liberalism. Political liberalism is:
A form of liberalism that assumes (reasonable) pluralism of moral, philosophical
and religious views, and which seeks general agreement among citizens on a
liberal political conception of justice that can serve as a public basis of
justification among them. It is Rawls’s attempt in his later works to show that a
just society is realistically possible in which reasonable citizens all accept a liberal
2
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conception of justice on the basis of moral values implicit in democratic culture,
even though they affirm many different ‘comprehensive’ doctrines.3
In other words, political liberalism attempts to reach agreement between different conceptions
and approaches, limited by reasonable pluralism and human rights, rather than attempting to
impose a world view on participants. Both Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism are
branches of political liberalism. According to Rawls, this approach is most likely to be
implemented and achieve its goals, because it appeals to reality. Political liberalism, thus, “does
not assume the validity of individualist views of the good life…the idea is that…the individualist
treatment of persons as separate from the substantial ideas they may share with others.”4
In the context of political liberalism, an international social contract such as I have
proposed here is realistic if can be “regarded as an achievable ideal given the permanent
conditions of human nature, including burdens of judgment.”5 If my proposal does not achieve
this, then it is not a proposal towards a realistic utopia, and thus cannot be consistent with the
goals of Rawlsianism or cosmopolitanism. Thus, the primary objection to my proposal is that it
is not consistent with a realistic utopia.
The first form of the implementation argument is that wealthy states would never agree to
terms that disfavor them more than the existing global basic structure does, even if these terms
are generally more just. An objector in this vein would argue that wealthy states, who hold
power in the status quo, would never accept the idea that they must distribute their resources or
the benefits they reap from the global basic structure to worse-off countries. Furthermore, this
objection posits that it is impossible to successfully and meaningfully challenge the power of
state sovereignty, and, insofar as my proposal requires international institutions to enforce global
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justice, the state would be undermined by my proposal. Therefore, the wealthy and powerful
states that are benefited by the unjust status quo would never accept a policy, even a just one,
that in implementation resulted in a net harm to them. On this account, the very existence of the
unjust global basic structure demonstrates that there is no political willpower to modify the
power of wealthy states or the high standards of living in wealthy states so that other states’
situations may improve. States pursue policies of self-interest, even when doing so massively
violates the rights of others. Consider, for example, wars of aggression such as the invasion of
Europe by Germany in World War II, or colonization, which directly prioritized the rights of
wealthy European states over the rights of other states. Given these historical, empirical
realities, asking states to be concerned with the rights of other states, and to allow for the
interests of the least well-off states to be prioritized is, according to this objection, impractical.
Thus, my proposal does not successfully merge a cosmopolitan and Rawlsian liberal account,
because it fails to promote a realistic utopia.
The flaw in this objection is that it is unduly pessimistic about the trajectory of
international relations. As Louis Henkin observes, "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."6
International law is generally non-binding, with little to nothing in the way of enforcement
mechanisms, yet the vast majority of states still adhere to it. The majority of empirical work
regarding international relations has confirmed this.7 Rogue states are few and far between, and
even rogue states often cooperate on some international issues.8 Thus, "to deny that international

6

Henkin, Louis. 1979. How Nations Behave. New York: Columbia University Press. 47.
Koh, Harold Hongju. 1997. “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale Law Journal, Vol.
106, No. 8, Symposium: Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and Religion. 2599-2659:
2599.
8
Ibid. 2603.

Fetrow 82

law exists as a system of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence."9 Furthermore,
this is not a new phenomenon: historically, allies in Europe would assist each other in times of
war, even when doing so was not directly advantageous to the assisting country.
The fact that states generally adhere to international law is important in that it
demonstrates that states are willing to act in ways that, while not directly benefiting them,
nevertheless serve the justice of the international community. The implementation objection
rests on the premise that states’ self-interest dictates their external interest, and that, for wealthy
states, the unjust distributions in the global basic structure are to their advantage. However, in
light of the empirical consensus that, in fact, states are not exclusively motivated to ruthlessly
pursue self-interest at the expense of others, this premise, and the objection that stems from it,
cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, the trajectory of the international community is increasingly towards
recognizing and enforcing rights of people in all states, not merely within one’s own borders.
Starting with the United Nations and the Nuremburg Trials that emerged from the desolation of
World War Two, the international community has moved increasingly towards mutual
cooperation and consensus on issues such as human rights and peace and security. Since its
inception, the United Nations has ratified hundreds of treaties, including fifty-three treaties in the
twenty-first century alone.10 Many of these treaties have widespread acceptance and ratification.
The Convention of the Rights of the Child, for instance, has one hundred and forty signatory
states, including such disparate societies as Afghanistan, Kirgizstan, and Zimbabwe, as well as
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wealthy states such as France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.11 In
other words, a broad and disparate group of states, including wealthy countries, has agreed to
adhere to international principles of human rights, even though it results in a potential loss of
sovereignty and does not have any immediate benefits for the state. Thus, the notion that my
proposal is not viable is not true insofar as the empirical premises it rests on are false. The
trajectory of international relations is increasingly towards stronger international institutions and
interconnectedness, as demonstrated by the rise of the United Nations.
The European Union, NAFTA, OPEC, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
and the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) are all further demonstrations that the
empirical basis for rejecting my proposal are not, on face, persuasive. The rise of international
cooperation has touched every corner of the globe and dramatically influenced and shaped state
policy. Insofar as the trajectory of international relations has been towards increased cooperation
and agreement, even at the expense of direct self-interest, the policy I propose does not violate
the criteria of a realistic utopia.
A second variation of the implementation objection is that the policy I have proposed is
an imposition of western values that unduly prioritizes individual rights over group rights,
thereby alienating non-western cultures. Thus, non-western cultures would not benefit from the
social contract because joining the international social contract would necessitate a loss of
culture for them. Thus, insofar as only Western states would agree to participate, the
international social contract could never successfully and universally be implemented. There
are two responses to this objection. First, the structure of the international social contract is
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created by representatives of all states, not just Western states. Second and most importantly,
reasonable pluralism within the international contract promotes and preserves cultural diversity.
First, the international contract that I propose here is the agreement that would be reached
by every state situated behind a veil of ignorance. That is, the representative of a communitarian
society like Japan would have no knowledge of the individualistic or communitarian aspects of
their country, just as the representative of an individualistic society like the United States would
be unaware of their individualistic tendencies. Thus, the principles that would derive from this
position would both preserve individual rights as well as allowing for group rights. In this way,
the communitarian concerns of non-Western societies would not be realized, because the
structure that creates the principles already accounts for variations in perspective.
Second, reasonable pluralism is built into the structure of the international social contract.
While human rights limitations prevent extremity in cultural difference—it would prevent, for
example, a state from preventing women from accessing equivalent education as their male
counterparts—pluralism preserves and protects variations in culture. Furthermore, the
conception of human rights is designed by the international original position to allow for
pluralism, thus the institutions created represent a consensus by many cultures, not an imposition
of European values. While it is true that human rights limits pluralism’s bound, the
representatives in the hypothetical original position would be unaware of the cultural norms, and
thus the principles that would derive would be based on consensus and agreement, rather than
alienation. Thus, this second implementation concern is unjustified.
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The Sustainability Objection
The second principle objection within the framework of political liberalism is the
sustainability objection. The sustainability objection posits that even if an international social
contract were implemented, it would fall apart. That is, even if implemented, it could not be
maintained. According to this objection, the principles I have proposed here are self
contradictory insofar as the principles derived from the international social contract would
necessitate open borders which would collapse the system of states this model requires into a
world state.
Seyla Benhabib, a cosmopolitan, has argued that "the status of alienage ought not to
denude one of fundamental rights."12 In other words, human rights ought not be premised upon
the membership in one state or another. Further, Benhabib contends that "to view political
society as a 'complete and closed social system' is incompatible with other premises of Rawlsian
liberalism."13 Instead, representatives of states would choose principles that allowed for freedom
of movement across borders, so-called ‘open borders,’ because in an original position,
representatives would seek to ensure maximum rights for their citizens, even if those maximum
rights occurred in another state. Thus, in the original position, representatives would pick a
principle of open borders. The result would be an international society of societies which are
“overlapping, and fluid entities, whose boundaries are permeable and porous, [where] whole
moral visions travel across borders, are assimilated into other contexts, are then reexported back
into the home country, and so on.”14 Furthermore, in order to establish a principle of fair equality
of opportunity, furthermore, open borders would be necessary. If my nationality limits my
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options because better opportunities are available to citizens of another state, then fair equality of
opportunity is violated. Thus, instead of a collection of states that come together to regulate the
global basic structure, the principle of open borders that would be necessitated by the structure of
the original position would create a free-flowing, shifting hodge-podge of communities and
identities that would be completely unregulated by state borders. States, thus, would be
inefficient actors for regulating the basic structure of smaller areas, and a world state would be
necessitated. If a world state was necessitated, the convergence that I hold should occur between
Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans would collapse, as Rawlsian liberals explicitly reject a
world state, and the proposal I make would collapse.
The flaw in this objection is twofold: first, representatives of states would not choose a
principle of open borders, and secondly, a principle of open borders, even if it were a necessity
of the structure I create, would not cause the structures I endorse to crumble.
First, representatives would not choose a principle of open borders. Representatives of
states are concerned not only with the rights of their people, but also with the institutional
legitimacy and strength of that state. A principle of open borders uniquely challenges the
institutional strength, and, indeed, existence, of the state. The massive migrations that Benhabib
envisions would decimate the population size, institutions, and economic abilities of the
countries whose populations emigrated, while the cultural integrity, social and economic
institutions, and governing capacities of the countries that received the immigrants would be
compromised. Thus, on an institutional level, representatives of states in the original position
would be disincentivized from creating a principle of open borders, because doing so would
actively destabilize political, economic, and social institutions of both countries involved.
Immigration, then, is unlike other issues where one state stands to benefit from a policy while the

Fetrow 87

other stands to lose. In the case of immigration, both types of states stand to lose on institutional
ground.
The objector may still reply that human rights must trump these institutional concerns: if
people stand to have a better life, they ought be allowed to emigrate as they see fit, regardless of
the cost to institutions that such migrations might engender. This response fails for two reasons.
First, the principles of justice that derive from the convergence of cosmopolitan and Rawlsian
liberal approaches that I describe in the previous chapter would ensure a different principle
between states, which would serve to reduce inequalities and create opportunities and justice in
all states. Thus, any injustices that give rise to massive inequalities that would create the
conditions for massive migrations would not be created under the principles of justice I propose.
In other words, if the difference principle is satisfied, there will not be any demand for massive
migrations. A need for open borders is evidence of an unjust global order, and cannot rightfully
be applied to the principles of global justice I have argue for here. Furthermore, the injustices
and suffering caused by the collapse of states as a result of massive migrations would exacerbate,
rather than solve the human rights harms in the status quo. Thus, even if human rights abuses are
not solved in the short term, the proposal of open borders, far from alleviating these concerns,
would exacerbate them.
There is another option for what would happen if my proposal and open borders were
simultaneously implanted. It is, I think, a more realistic possibility, though still insufficient to
require open borders. In a world in which the principles of justice I argue for were applied, there
would be relative justice across the globe. There would be no need for massive migrations,
because such migrations are generally the results of vast and unjust economic inequalities (such
as the case of the United States and Mexico), or other social and political disturbances, such as
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war, which is itself often the result of an unjust basic structure. In a world regulated by these
principles here, these phenomena would, theoretically, not occur. Moreover, in cases of famine,
drought, or other natural disasters, duties of assistance, part of the difference principle, would
prevent the need for massive relocations until such time as the disaster had passed. Thus, the
impetus for migration across open borders would be based on family location, job opportunities,
or other personal reasons. The justice-based reasons for allowing open borders seem not to apply
in this case: the right is not to have equal opportunity in every country; rather, it is to have justice
in your country. Other considerations, then, may apply. In this case, reasonable pluralism is
appropriately allowable. A state’s desire to maintain its culture, history, and traditions can take
precedent here, because rights are not being violated. Therefore, because open borders are not
justified on a human rights ground, reasonable pluralism allows that states be able to choose who
and how many immigrants they are willing to accept.
The second objection that rises from the sustainability objection is that the international
institutions that would be necessary to enforce the principles that derive from the international
social contract would be so onerous that they would collapse, either due to corruption, disparate
power allocation, or a variety of other factors. The institutions would be simply too large, to
complex, and would collapse. The flaw in this second objection, however, is that it is not a
necessary condition of the model I have proposed. It is, in short, an empirical, rather than
theoretical question. Moreover, empirically, international institutions do exist and have not
collapsed under their own weight. The sustainability objection, thus, is no more compelling in
this formulation than it is in regards to immigration.
Within a liberal, realist framework, neither of the questions that arise are, ultimately,
compelling reasons to disavow the argument that I make here. Thus, within the context of
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Rawlsian liberalism, my proposal stands. Other objections from beyond the liberal camp, such
as objections from utilitarians such as Peter Singer might provide compelling counterarguments
to my arguments here. However, in the scope of my project, I set these objections aside, and
argue that within the context of Rawlsian social contract theory, my proposal holds.

The Interconnectivity Objection
The second branch of objection within the Rawlsian liberal framework is that the global
basic structure is not analogous to the domestic basic structure. If the global basic structure does
not have an impact on the chances, potential outcomes, and options available to people living
across the world, then my argument cannot hold. The tension that exists within Rawls’s
conception of justice in the domestic and international case is predicated on the idea that he is
treating like kinds in unlike ways. That is, because the global basic structure has an equivalent
impact on peoples’ lives as the domestic basic structure, the institutions and norms that regulate
them must be similar in kind. This idea underlies my argument that Rawlsian liberal and
cosmopolitan approaches to global justice would converge. If the global basic structure is, in
fact, not as deeply pervasive as I hold, then my argument cannot stand.
It is beyond doubt that the world is deeply and increasingly interconnected. However, the
extent to which this is true may be disputed. The scope of the global basic structure is
fundamentally an empirical question. The interconnectivity objection holds, thus, that while an
increase in international law or other explicitly international institutions or norms may be
occurring, domestic structures still have purely domestic implications. Thus, states cannot be
held responsible to others for their actions, because the ramifications of domestic policies are
entirely domestic.
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However, this argument is empirically falsified. Both in a variety of academic literature
as well as public discourse accept the existence and pervasive nature of the global basic structure
as a given. Discussions of globalization, transnational identities, and international movements all
accept and provide support for claims of global interconnectivity and the existences of a global
basic structure. I provide examples from a variety of academic fields and geographic regions
here to further demonstrate that the global basic structure does exist in the pervasive and
widespread form that I advocate in chapter three.
One clear example of the interconnected nature of the world is the relationship between
domestic agricultural policy and international welfare. As far back as 1992, Giovanni Anania,
Mary Bohman and Colin A. Carter have argued that wheat subsidies in the United States, which
were established in order to help American farmers, have had effects not only on American
wheat prices and production, but on global welfare.15 Similarly, the United States maintains
heavy subsidies for other crops, like cotton, which cover as much as 80% of the cost of cotton
production.16 Unlike the United States, however, “developing countries cannot afford to
subsidies their farmers as generously.”17 Therefore, farmers in these developing countries cannot
afford to compete with their American counterparts, because of the institutional and structural
advantage of American cotton growers. This means that cotton farmers in areas like Western
Africa are unable to use cotton to create profits that would allow them to better their welfare and
improve their own basic structure. Moreover, this institutional advantage for American cotton
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producers exists even in spite of dramatically lower cost of living and production costs in
countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Malawi, and Benin.18
The flip side of this is also true. In Bolivia, for instance, quinoa has been a staple grain
for millennia. However, as Bolivia has expanded its trade connections, quinoa has grown popular
in western liberal democracies.19 This has caused quinoa prices to skyrocket in Bolivia, meaning
that those that have traditionally been able to afford quinoa can no longer afford to do so, and
instead are forced to purchase less expensive staple foods like wheat or corn—often produced in
the United States by the same subsidies that reduce welfare in Western Africa.20 Agriculture,
thus, is one area where it is clear that the interconnected nature of the world means that domestic
basic structures are not separate. However, agriculture is not the only economic area that
demonstrates the existence of the global basic structure. The disparity in wealth between the
global rich and the global poor is deeply created, sustained, and exacerbated by the global basic
structure.21 This interconnectivity necessitates consideration of the global basic structure in
determining principles of global justice, particularly in regards to economic distribution.
Another area where it is clear that the world’s interconnectivity has serious and lasting
effects is law. International law is increasingly defined and understood, in part because of the
connectivity of other aspects of the basic structure. As one legal scholar argues, “law is heavily
implicated in the process of globalization.”22 An ever-growing list of treaties, international
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bodies, trade-agreements, international justice systems, and international copyright law restrict
the possibilities of countries, corporations, organizations, and individuals.23 These international
institutions, structures, and agreements are perhaps the clearest examples of the existence of the
global basic structure. They demonstrate that a series of explicit regulations and institutions both
construct and regulate at least to some extent a basic structure that affects individuals and states.
Domestic political decisions are likewise affected by the global basic structure. Theories
of international movements present compelling arguments for the global basic structure. Many
social movement theorists, for example, contend that by reaching out to advocates in other states,
advocacy can create a ‘boomerang’ effect which amplifies their voice and power in achieving
their policy aims. This creates pressure on international bodies, through which groups can
influence national governments through the pressure imposed by the institutions of the global
basic structure.24 If activists can harness the power of the global basic structure, it must, by
necessity, both exist, and be powerful enough to influence individual states.
Other aspects of culture are similarly formed by and limited by the global basic structure.
Modern technology has rendered light-speed transmission of information, art, ideas, news, and
other media to distant corners of the planet mundane. No sooner than an event happens than it is
filmed, photographed, uploaded, and shared with followers around the world. Ideas bounce from
China to South Africa to Argentina to Poland in a blink. Culture—food, music, dance, fashion,
and a myriad of other norms—has never been so international, nor so formed, unchecked, by the
international community. Culture, thus, like economic, politics, or law, is deeply and pervasively
influenced by the existence and strength of the global basic structure.
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This discussion of instances of the global basic structure is far from exhaustive. What it
does serve to demonstrate, however, is that the global basics structure (1) exists, (2) is pervasive,
and (3) seriously impacts individuals’ and states’ opportunities and outcomes, just as the basic
structure in a domestic society does. Thus, the tension that I indentify between Rawls’s domestic
and international cases stands, and my argument likewise stands. Like the implementation and
sustainability objections, then, the interconnectivity objection is ultimately not compelling.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks

Global justice has long been a concern of philosophers and policy makers alike. Creating
and promoting institutions and norms that enhance global justice is the center of heated debate
on which the welfare and even lives of billions of people hang. Though the discussion of justice
that I provide here is by no means complete, my results have implications for philosophical
consideration of the issue as well as political and legal considerations.
First, my results have implications for theorists of global justice. Rawlsian liberals must
consider more seriously the implications of the reality of a global basic structure for their theory.
If the argument that I make here holds, the existence and pervasiveness of the global basic
structure render the differences in Rawls’s account of domestic versus international justice
unsustainable and problematic. Recognizing the existence of the global basic structure requires a
serious reevaluation of the Rawlsian liberal framework for international justice. Moreover, it
means that the egalitarian principles of justice that Rawls advocates ought be applied in the
international case in addition to the domestic case. Furthermore, accepting the empirical truth of
the global basic structure has implications for the structure of the global social contract insofar as
Rawlsian liberalism seeks to promote a realistic utopia. Recognition of the global basic structure
necessitates the use of states as actors, as well as broad principles of inclusion and membership.
These reevaluations of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples and its successors ultimately require that
Rawlsian liberalism converge on cosmopolitanism.
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Additionally, the global basic structure means that Rawlsian rejection of libertarian
entitlement theory as an adequate mechanism to ensure social justice on the international level.
Rawls’s attempt to distinguish the domestic case from the international case rests on the idea that
there are background conditions that meaningfully shape and limit one’s choices and options
only in the domestic case. Put another way, a basic structure only exists at the domestic level,
not the international one. However, as I have demonstrated, this is empirically and demonstrably
incorrect. Because the global basic structure has just as much, perhaps even more, impact on the
scope of available choices, the arguments that seek to distinguish the domestic from the
international case crumble. Rawls’s critique of libertarianism is thus equally compelling at the
international level as it is on the domestic one. Because libertarianism ignores the basic
structure, it falsely assumes that our actions are fully our own, and our successes and failures are
ours to celebrate or bear equally alone. However, given the global basic structure, external
factors affect our outcomes, and thus regulation of the basic structure is necessary to ensure
justice.
Furthermore, my results have implications for cosmopolitans, as well. Recognizing the
existence and influence of the global basic structure supports my claim that cosmopolitans
should recognize the value of states and use them as the primary actor in an international social
contract, despite cosmopolitans’ ultimate concern for the individual, because of the pragmatic
benefits to individual welfare that derive from states as actors. Furthermore, it emphasizes
institutional cosmopolitanism, rather than interactional cosmopolitanism. This means that
cosmopolitans ought be concerned with structures and institutions rather than individual actions.
These considerations drive cosmopolitanism further towards Rawlsian liberalism into a
convergence of the two theoretical branches.
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Discussion of the nature, scope, and basis for global justice is important on a pragmatic
as well as philosophical level. Questions of global justice occur not only in academia, but in
governance and legal circles as well. Global justice is the center of debates around many topics,
including the environment, intellectual property, war, and human rights. My project here has
not proposed on advocated for particular policies, mechanisms for implementation, or guidelines
for enforcement. Further work must be done to determine how the theoretical framework I
propose here might be implemented into specific policies that most effectively promote global
justice. My suggestion that the global basic structure is pluralistic provides a useful mechanism
for beginning to think about how issues like the environment, war, intellectual property, or
immigration might be addressed. Put another way, when we think about the global basic
structure as multifaceted, solutions to different problems may have different institutional
solutions. The global basic structure is complex, and the system that addresses it might be
equivalently complex. Determining how this complex structure would be organized requires
further investigation and analysis.
Although here I focus primarily on urgent issues like poverty and welfare, the
implications of my argument go far beyond that. A useful next step in the debate over how best
to create a just global basic structure would be to consider issues such as regulation of
multinational corporations, green cards and work visas, and trade.1 The global basic structure
has serious implications for these issues as well as for the welfare concerns that I primarily
discuss here.
Furthermore, the analysis here does not discuss at length what the content of a doctrine of
human rights would entail beyond the scope of welfare rights. The principles and guidelines that
1

See James, Aaron. 2012. Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy (Oxford
Political Philosophy). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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I established in chapter four law foundations for this exploration, but further work must be done
to fully conceptualize what a doctrine of human rights would entail on my account of global
justice.
By coming to terms with the reality of our increasingly interconnected world, theories of
global justice are able to better able to provide accounts for a realistic utopia. It requires
Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans to converge on an account of justice that advocates
egalitarian principles and human rights. Further discussion might focus on the implications of
these principles for other aspects of the global basic structure, or explore what policies and
institutions might best promote the principles that I advance here. In our interconnected and
interdependent world, answering the question of how to promote global justice has never been so
urgent.
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